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1 
I 
The subject of educational law Is of considerable 
interest to teachers, and becomes increasingly important for 
the educator who hopes to rise to a higher administrative 
position. There are essential rules of law dealing with the 
relations of teachers with pupils and teachers with the school 
committee, that are necessarily accumulated as part of the 
working equipment of every student who prepares for the teach¬ 
ing profession. In the ordinary course of events the beginning 
teacher has some educational law impressed upon him early in 
his professional practice. Prom established co-workers and 
through the sometimes stern rulings of his superiors the young 
teacher absorbs information about the law as it applies to the 
school system. Occasionally he is puzzled as to whether this 
is bona-fide law or simply dicta from above, and often he re¬ 
gards the rules as he hears them as needless and ridiculous* 
The gradual accumulation of a’ knowledge of educational law 
entirely by experience, rulings and the recollections of 
fellow-teachers is a slow process of training for most effi¬ 
cient and effective work in education. Too often this method 
of professional improvement is fraught with possibilities of 
mis-information and weak understanding of the necessity for 
the particular law that applies. Frequently, the young teacher 
is annoyed upon being confronted with new rules at every turn, 
and becomes discouraged with the "red-tape” aspects of school 
administration* 
2, 
7 If the prospective teacher could be encouraged to accept 
a scund training in the fundamental law that governs education, 
there mi^t be less distress, annoyance', and interruption to 
his progress in the teaching profession, and consequently a 
happier cooperation between teachers and administration. A 
fair presentation of educational law should Inspire prospec¬ 
tive teachers with an appreciation of the wholesome relation 
of the courts and the schools in a democracy. Ihe teacher 
would start upon his life-work Inspired by the realization 
that the courts of our Nation are interested in and will zeal¬ 
ously guard and maintain a sound public school system. Rather 
than creating in the mind of a young teacher suspicion of over¬ 
bearing tactics, the publication of rules should thus only re¬ 
call to him the ever-watchful and benevolent attitude of our 
courts for education. 
Unfortunately, such sound training in education law is 
not always available for prospective teachers. Greater empha¬ 
sis has always been placed upon the operation of school law 
than upon the basic reasoning and splendid decisions of great 
jurists. Even where courses in educational law are available 
for teachers, the material for study is not always accessible 
to the students* 
It has been my pui^ose in the preparation of this Thesis 
to do some little service toward making material in educational 
law available for the use of teachers. 
While engaged upon education courses upon the direction of 
Professor Winthrop S. Welles, I became intrigued with the possi 
3. 
J 
bllity of collecting the essential law of education into a 
I 
reasonably-sized case book for study and reference by teachers. 
I started to collect and analyze the leading cases in educa¬ 
tional law that had arisen in Massachusetts and was somewhat 
amazed at the accumulation of material. It was obvious that 
we could not expect even the serious student of education to 
comb throu^ over three hundred volumes of the Reports of the 
Supreme Judicial Court in search of material on the relation 
of our courts to our schools. Even if all the cases were 
brought together we would still have a cumbersome book, and 
there would be a great deal of comparatively unimportant mater¬ 
ial to confuse the serious student. 
My task became apparent after I had read but a few of the 
leading cases. It should be my responsibility to read and anal¬ 
yze all the cases on educational law that had ever arisen in 
this Commonwealth and collect fundamental infomation about 
all of the cases. I should then tabulate the information 
and make it easily available for the serious student of educa¬ 
tional law. Then I should collect the representative cases 
and best decisions on educational law and present them in a 
case-book where they should be indicated as typical of a group 
of court decisions. Other cases might be cited for use by 
students who cared to make further investigation beyond the 
case-book. Such a case-book should make easily accessible to 
students the fundamental law of education. 
To help in determining the importance of cases to be in¬ 
cluded, I make frequent reference to the General Laws Relating 
4* 
to Education. In this booklet, that is a frequent reference 
source for teachers and administrators, all cases relating to 
a chapter or a section of the General Laws are cited by 
volxame and page of the Massachusetts Reports* Obviously, it 
would be helpful to the teacher or student to know readily the 
nature of the case referred to, and so I developed a numerical 
index to all the cases cited in this reprint of the General 
Laws Relating to Education* The Numerical Index (pagella) 
will prove a time-saver and an aid to the student who wishes 
to have infomation on the cases relating to or interpreting 
a specific section of the General Laws, and this may be done 
without reference to the Massachusetts Reports or the Annotated 
Laws of Massachusetts* 
For reference to the original reports, the student will 
find included in this case-book a list of all cases relating 
to education that have been reported from the Supreme Judi¬ 
cial Court of Massachusetts* These cases are arranged in al¬ 
phabetical order, and also are noted as to the nature of the 
case* Thus the student who wishes to make further investi¬ 
gation upon any phase of educational law may determine in ad¬ 
vance through reference to the numerical or alphabetical in¬ 
dexes whether or not a particular case will reveal the infor¬ 
mation that he seeks* When the student knows in advance only 
the volume and page of the Massachusetts Reports for the given 
case, the Numerical Index will prove most helpful, and the 
Alphabetical Index can serve when only the title of the case 
5. 
Is at hand* 
Although it was impracticable to Include in this case¬ 
book a great number of cases, it seemed advisable that every 
aid toward understanding the nature of All the cases should 
appear. For that reason you will find here a complete tabu¬ 
lation of all the cases with the rule of law or subject-matter 
of the particular case indicated. This outline is so arranged 
that we might call it a table of contents for the more com¬ 
plete collection that could be made* It should prove most 
helpful to a student in discovering cases that deal specifi¬ 
cally with a point in educational law that is not covered by 
the representative cases that are here included. 
The selection of representative cases to place in this 
book called for exercising Judgment that might be considered 
as arbitrary by some readers. Naturally, the decisions and 
opinions conveying the greatest human interest appealed for 
inclusion. But there is so much human interest in many of the 
educational cases that found their way into the Supreme Judi¬ 
cial Court Reports that a more scientific method of determin¬ 
ing the cases for inclusion had to be evolved. The cases which 
are presently Important in school administration, as disclosed 
from personal experience and inquiry must be Included. Endur¬ 
ing quality of a court decision is indicated by the frequency 
with which that decision is cited in later opinions of the 
court and by other appellate tribunals, and those cases which 
revealed such lasting value have been included. Due consider- 
was given to those cases which revealed great clarity of 
6. 
language, and I may be excused if I occasionally pay a small 
tribute to a favorite justice whose style I have enjoyed, 
by including his opinion in the group that make this case¬ 
book • 
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A TOPICAL ANALYSIS OP MASSACHUSETTS CASES 
IN EDUCATIONAL LAW 
Historical Interest of courts In our schools 
Chapter 5, Section 2, Constitution of Commonwealth 
Cushing V. Newburyport 10 Mete. (51 Mass.)508 
Jenkins v. Inhabitants of Andover 103 Mass. 94 
Decatur v. Peabody 251 Mass. 82 
The Parent and Child 
Right to an education 
Obligation on town to furnish schools 
Commonwealth v. Inhab. of Dedham 
16 Mass. 141 
Age for admission to school 
Alvord V. Chester 180 Mass. 20 
Right to complete education 
Needham v. Wellesley 139 Mass. 372 
Public schools are open to all 
Commonwealth v. Conn.Valley St. Ry. Co* 
196 Mass. 309 
Limit of obligation on towns 
Newcomb v. Inhab. of Rockport 183 Mass. 74 
Davis V. Inhad. of Chilmark 199 Mass. 112 
Obligation on towns to pay tuition 
Millard v. Inhab. of Egremont 164 Mass. 430 
Hurlburt v. Inhab. of Boxford 171 Mass. 501 
Piske V. Inhab. of Huntington 179 Mass. 571 
Inhab. of Haverhill v. Gale 103 Mass. 104 
gie duties of the parents 
Obligation to send to school or provide education 
Commonwealth v. Roberts 159 Mass. 372 
Obligation to have child vaccinated 
Commonwealth v. Green 268 Mass. 585 
Commonwealth v. Childs 299 Mass. 367 
Limitations imposed on unvaccinated 
Hammond v. Inhab. of Hyde Park 193 Mass. 29 
SpOffard V. Carleton 238 Mass. 528 
Obligation to cooperate in school management of 
child 
Spiller V. Woburn 
Nicholls V. Lynn 
Commonwealth v. Johnson 
12 Allen(94 Mass*) 
127 
297 Mass. 65 
309 Mass. 476 
The duties of the child 
Obligation to obey school rules 
Antell V. Stokes 
Morrison v. Lawrence 
Obligation to cooperate 
Jones V. Fitchburg 
Wulff V. Wakefield 
287 Mass. 103 
181 Mass. 127 
211 Mass. 66 
221 Mass. 427 
Obligation to behave orderly 
Hodgkins v. Rockport 
Learock v. Putnam 
Spear v. Cummings 
105 Mass. 475 
111 Mass. 499 
23 Pick.(40 Mass.) 
224 
Limitations on the right to attend school 
Weak-minded refused 
Watson V. City of Cambridge 157 Mass. 561* 
Incompetent may be re-classified 
Barnard v. Shelboume 216 Mass. 19 
The unclean refused 
Carr v. Dighton 
The tardy may be suspended 
Russell V. Lynnfleld 
229 Mass. 304 
116 Mass. 365 
The immoral refused 
Sheiman v. Charlestoym 8 Cush.(62 Mass.) 
160 
The School Committee 
Extent of control over school affairs 
Control of school fimds 
Charlestown v. Gardner 98 Mass. 587 
School Committee v. Mayor 
Lowell 
Leonard v. Springfield 
School committee determines 
Hunter v. School Committee 
Cambridge 
Batchelder v. Salem 
of 
265 Mass. 353 
241 Mass. 325 
salaries 
of 
244 Mass. 296 
4 Cush.(58 Mass.) 
599 
14 
Decatur v, Peabody 251 Mass. 82 
School committee contracts within its statutory 
power 
Brine v. Cambridge 265 Mass. 452 
Wright V. Boston 270 Mass. 338 
Parkhurst v. Revere 263 Mass. 364 
Wilson V. Cambridge 101 Mass. 142 
Wilson V. Brouder 291 Mass. 389 
School committee controls school property 
Day V. Greenfield 234 Mass. 31 
School committee can close building 
Morse v. Ashley 193 Mass. 294 
School committee can close school 
Knowles v. Boston 12 Gray (78 Mass.) 
339 
School committee contracts cannot be nullified 
Kimball v. Salem 111 Mass. 87 
Fiduciary nature of the office 
Election to committee ends teaching 
Clifford V. Lynn 275 Mass. 268 
Committeeman cannot be paid as school doctor 
Barrett v. Medford 254 Mass. 384 
Committeeman cannot be elected Mayor before temn ends 
Wood V. Cambridge 269 Mass. 67 
The superintendent is the executive officer of the committ- 
ee 
Russell V. Gannon 281 Mass. 398 
Toothaker v. Rockland 256 Mass. 584 
Wood V. Cutter 138 Mass. 149 
The linion School Committee 
Reed v. Deerfield 176 Mass. 473 
Freeman v. Bourne 170 Mass. 289 
The municipality’s liability is limited 
Bigelow V. Randolph 14 Gray 541 
Hill V. Boston 122 Mass. 344 
Sullivan V. Boston 123 Mass. 545 
15. 
McKenna v. Kimball 
Sweeney v. Boston 
Warburton v. Quincy 
145 Mass. 555 
309 Mass. 106 
309 Mass. Ill 
The Teacher 
The teacher holds a responsible office 
School District v. Mowry 9 Allen (91 Mass.) 
94 
The principal is a teacher designated to have charge 
Boody v. Barnstable 2^6 Mass. 134 
The committee can change the duties of a teacher 
McDevltt V. Malden 291 Mass. 213 
Sweeney v. Revere 249 Mass. 525 
Downey v. Lowell 305 Mass. 329 
The salaries of teachers are determined by the committee 
The teacher*3 salary continues when schools are closed 
Libby V. Douglas 175 Mass. 128 
The teacher may be paid during leaves of absence 
Averell v. Newburyport 236 Mass. 208, 
241 Mass. 333 
The teacher may be paid on sabbatical leave 
Whittaker v. Salem 216 Mass. 483 
The salary cannot be paid after the death of the teacher 
Donlan v. Boston 223 Mass. 285 
The committee can reduce the salaries of teachers 
Paquette v. Fall River 278 Mass. 172 
A teacher cannot be paid after dismissal 
Wood V. Medfield 123 Mass. 545 
The tenure law protects the teacher 
One must be elected to serve **at the discretion” 
Pulvlno V. Yarmouth 286 Mass. 21 
The committee must obey the statute 
Frye v. Leicester 310 Mass. 537 
Only bona-fide teachers qualify 
Lamarsh v. Chicopee 272 Mass. 15 
Teachers may be discharged for ”good cause” 
Gardner v. Lowell 221 Mass. 150 
Corrigan v. New Bedford 250 Mass. 334 
16, 
Duffey V. Hopkinton 236 
0316re must be a judicial hearing on 
Graves v* Wellesley 299 
Sweeney v. Revere 249 
Cavemo v* Fellows 286 
300 
Marriage can be a "good cause" 
Sheldon v. Hopedale _ 276 
Rinaldo v. Dreyer 294 
Mass* 5 
the "cause" 
Mass* 80 
Mass* 525 
Mass* 440, 
Mass* 331 
Mass* 230 
Mass* 167 
The teacher and the pupil 
The teacher must enforce discipline 
Davis V* Boston 133 Mass* 103 
Bishop V* Rowley 105 Mass* 460 
The teacher cannot abuse a pupil 
Commonwealth v* Randall 4 Gray (70 Mass*) 
36 
The teacher is protected in liability 
Fulgoni V* Johnson S'02 Mass. 421 
17. 
Chapter I 
Historical Interest of Our Courts 
in the Public Schools. 
The courts in Massachusetts have always taken a healthy 
interest in the public education of our citizens. Although 
education is primarily the concern of the State Legislature 
in creating facilities and establishing requirements for all 
the towns to abide by, there have been many occasions when 
the courts have by careful interpretation of the law upheld 
public education. Moreover, the decisions of our Supreme 
Judicial Court have enunciated the traditional role of the 
school committee, and have helped the friends of public edu¬ 
cation to stand strongly against the groups which would deny 
the independence of the school system. 
Our Supreme Judicial Court has often quoted the portion 
of our State Constitution which is included in this Chapter 
as the basic charter for public education. 
Constitution for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
Part II, Chapter 5, Section 2 
"Wisdom and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused 
generally among the body of the people, being necessary for 
the preservation of their rights and liberties; and as these 
depend on spreading the opportunities and advantages of edu¬ 
cation in the various parts of the country, and among the 
different orders of the people, it shall be the duty of 
legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this 
18. 
commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and 
the sciences, and all seminaries of them; especially the 
university at Cambridge, public schools and grammar schools 
in the towns; to encourage private societies and public 
Institutions, rewards and Immunities, for the promotion of 
agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, manufactures, 
and a natural history of the country; to countenance and in¬ 
culcate the principles of humanity and general benevolence, 
public and private charity, industry and frugality, honesty 
and punctuality in their dealings; sincerity, good humor, 
and all social affections, and generous sentiments among the 
people.** 
John N. Cushing v. Inhabitants of Newburyport 
10 Mete. (51 Mass.) 602 (1845) 
John N. Cushing, a taxpayer of the toTm of Newburyport 
sought to recover a portion of the taxes paid because the 
town used tax money to construct a high school. At the time 
there was no State requirement upon the town to furnish a 
high school education to any of its inhabitants. 
J. **The establishment of schools for the education, to 
some extent at least, of all the children of the whole people, 
is not the result of any recent enactment; it is not the 
growth even of our present constitutional government, or the 
provincial government which preceded it, but extends back two 
hundred years to the early settlement of the colony. Indeed, 
the establishment of popular schools is understood to have 
20 
recover back the amount paid* 
William Jenkins and others v. Inhabitants of 
Andover 
103 Mass. 94 (1869) 
The town of Andover sought to raise money by taxation 
to donate to the support of Punchard Free School. In an 
attempt to thus pay town money to rebuild a private school 
which had been destroyed by fire, the town had a special 
statute passed by the General Court. The court held that the 
legislative enactment was in violation of the Constitution 
of the Commonwealth which forbids the use of town funds for 
the support of an institution wherein the "order and superin¬ 
tendence" are not in the school committee. 
The following excerpt from the decision is primarily of 
historical interest* 
The founders of the colony appreciated the importance 
and necessity of providing for the universal education of the 
people, at a very early period; and, to make it secure, they 
felt the necessity of placing it under the control of the peo¬ 
ple in each munclpality. Accordingly the colonial act.of 
1647 required each town containing fifty householders to main¬ 
tain a school in which the children should be taught to read 
and write; and each town containing one hundred householders 
to set up a grammar school, with a master able to Instruct 
youth so far as they might be fitted for the university. The 
teachers were to be paid, "either by the parents or masters 
of the children, or by the inhabitants in general by way of 
supply, as the major part of those that order the prudentials 
19. 
been one of the objects for which powers were conferred 
on certain associations of persons' living together in town¬ 
ships, enabling them to regulate and manage certtain pru¬ 
dential concerns in which they had a common interest.” 
On the whole, the court are of the opinion, that the pro¬ 
vision in the revised statutes, which provides the small 
amount of schooling which towns are compelled to provide for 
under a penalty, is not a definition or limit of the public 
schools which they have authority to provide for by taxation, 
but that the provision is to be taken in connection with the 
broader power given to towns to grant and vote money, as they 
shall judge necessary, for the support of schools, and also 
with the whole course of policy and of legislation on the 
same subject. This power is to be exercised in good faith, 
for the support of “town schools", as that term is well known 
and understood, for the common and general benefit, and not 
colorably for the promotion of other and different objects. 
In the agreed statement of'facts, it appears to the court that 
the schools established by the town of Newburyport, though 
extending to instruction in branches of knowledge beyond 
those required by the statutes, were yet town schools, within 
the proper meaning of that tem, provided for the benefit of 
all the inhabitants; that the taxes levied for the support 
of them, in common with other town charges, were not illegal; 
that the plaintiff, in paying his just proportion of them, 
was not illegally taxed, and cannot maintain this action to 
21. 
of the town shall appoint”* Thus they laid the foundation 
of a system of common schools which has been modified and 
improved from time to time; but has always retained its fun¬ 
damental character and purpose. It provided free education 
in the elementary branches of learning to the children of 
every town, in schools to be managed and controlled by the 
authorities of the town, and supported by taxation of the 
inhabitants, \mles3 sufficient contributions are received 
from other sources; and in the larger towns, which are 
sufficiently populous to make it desirable and reasonable, 
similar schools are to be maintained for the education of 
the more advanced pupils in higher branches of learning. 
22. 
Chapter II 
The Parent and the Child 
The Right to an Education 
There is an obligation upon the towns and cities in 
Massachusetts to provide schools for the education of the 
young. This obligation which was in an earlier day limited 
to lower education has become extended, and throu^ the de¬ 
vice of State aid extends to hi^ school and vocational ed¬ 
ucation for every worthy child in the Commonwealth. 
It has been repeatedly emphasized by our court that the 
public schools are open to all who reside within a town, and 
the statutes which require school attendance between the ages 
of seven and sixteen years do not set those limits for school 
attendance so as to exclude persons outside of those limits. 
In Needham v. Wellesley 159 Mass. 372, the court said in in¬ 
terpretation of such an attendance statute, ”This section 
does not fix the ages within which children may legally attend 
the public schools. It is designed to compel the education of 
children and not to fix a legal age”. 
Vanets L. Alvord v. Inhabitants of Chester 
180 Mass. 20 (1901) 
Tort by an infant, by her father and next friend, for 
the exclusion of the plaintiff from a public school in the 
town of Chester* Writ dated April 25, 1900. 
At the trial in the Superior Court, before Lawton, Jr., 
without a 3ury, it appeared, that the plaintiff at the time 
25. 
of her exclusion from the school in April 1900, was five 
years and ten months old, that she applied for admission 
to a public school for beginners taught by one teacher, and 
that at the time of the application there were children 
yoiinger than the plaintiff attending this school. The rule 
under which the plaintiff was excluded was as follows: 
That "All pupils must enter this school at the beginning of 
the fall term, or within three or four weeks thereafter; 
and that pupils desiring to enter at any other time were 
excluded unless found qualified to enter the classes then 
in said school." This rule did not apply to children be¬ 
tween the ages of seven and fourteen years, and children 
between those ages had the right to attend the public schools 
at any time. 
The rule was not recorded in the permanent record book 
provided for in Pub. Sts. c. 44 s. 27, and there was no re¬ 
cord in the book of any vote or order regulating the time of 
admission to the respective schools. 
The plaintiff requested rulings, that the plaintiff was 
excluded unlawfully because the regulation was not recorded 
in the permanent record book, that the regulation was not a 
lawful one, and that the plaintiff being of school age had 
the same ri^t to attend the public schools as if she had been 
between seven and fourteen years of age. 
The judge refused to give the rulings and found for the 
defendant; and the plaintiff alleged exceptions. 
4 
24. 
Barker, J. The sole reason for the exclusion of the 
plaintiff from school was the regulation adopted by the 
school committee to the effect that children under the 
age of seven years could not enter the school except at 
the beginning of the fall tern or within three or four 
weeks thereafter unless qualified to enter classes existing 
in the school at the time of entry. 
This was a reasonable rule. Children under seven years 
of age, although allowed to attend the public schools are not 
required to attend. 
St. 1898, c. 496, s. 12. Grading is a permitted, if 
not an essential, feature of the public school system. The 
introduction, late in the school year, of a very young 
scholar not qualified to enter the existing classes, would 
tend to impair the efficiency of the school, and so to pre¬ 
vent the other scholars from obtaining such advancement in 
learning and in training as would enable them to proceed with 
their education in due course. The right given to every child by 
St. 1898, c. 496, s. 7, to attend the public schools is not 
unqualified but is “subject to such reasonable regulations 
as to the numbers and qualifications of pupilssto be admitted 
to the respective schools, and as to other school matters, 
as the school committee shall from time to time prescribe." 
Nor was it essential to the validity of the regulation 
that it should be recorded in the permanent record book of 
the school committee, required by Pub. Sts. c. 44, s. 27. 
25. 
nJiat section directs the committee to appoint a secretary 
and directs the secretary to keep a permanent record book 
in.which all the votes, orders and proceedings of the 
committee shall be recorded. But this does not make in¬ 
valid all rules and orders of the committee not so recorded. 
Russell V. Lynnfield 116 Mass. 365,367. See also Libby v. 
Douglas, 175 Mass. 128, 130. 
Exceptions overruled* 
Note that the public schools are open to all, and that 
the school committee may admit children under seven. There 
is no prohibition upon school attendance after sixteen years, 
although the child is not compelled to attend. 
Commonwealth v. Conn. Valley St. Ry. Co. 
196 Mass. 309 
Eliza C. Millard, Admx. v. Inhabitants of Egremont 
164 Mass. 430 (1895) 
An action to recover tuition paid to another town after 
the town of Egremont withdrew its approval, which it had pre¬ 
viously given, to the attendance of child at high school in 
other town. 
Morton, J* The plaintiff contends that the school 
committee, having once given its approval could not withdraw 
it except for misconduct on the part of the pupil, and that 
the dau^ter of the intestate was entitled to pursue the 
studies on which she had entered until her graduation in 
due course, which it is said in the plaintiff’s brief would 
26. 
h^e been in June 1895. She further contends that. If this 
is not so, the defendant is liable for the amount paid for 
tuition for the term on which the daughter had entered at the 
time when her intestate first learned of the action of the 
school committee, or at least that it Is liable for the 
amount paid down to such time. 
The object of the statute appears to be to provide a way 
in which a child living in a town which is not obliged to 
maintain, and which presumably does not maintain, a high 
school, may attend one in a neighboring city or town at the 
expense of the town where he resides, and it seems to be an 
extension of Pub. Sts. c. 47, s. 6, 8. There is nothing in 
the act of 1891 or in the substituted act of 1894, c. 436, 
which obliges a town that is not required by law to maintain 
a high school to provide for the attendance of children liv¬ 
ing in it at a high school in another city or town, or which 
obliges any city or town to receive into its high school upon 
the payment of reasonable tuition children living in a town 
where there is no high school. There is no such provision 
elsewhere. Cities and towns are bound to furnish within their 
respective limits **schools for the instruction of all the 
children who may legally attend public school therein”, (Pub. 
Sts. c. 44, s. 1) but they are not obliged to provide for the 
attendance of such children at schools elsewhere. In certain 
cases two adjacent towns, or two or more contiguous districts 
in adjoining towns, may unite and maintain a school for the 
27. 
common benefit of children In said towns or districts, or 
children living remote from any public school in the town 
where they reside may be allowed to attend school in an 
adjoining town under such regulations and on such terms as 
the school committees of said towns agree upon or they may, 
with the consent of the school committees, attend schools 
in towns or cities other than those in which their parents 
or guardians reside. But these matters are left to the dis¬ 
cretion of the school committees or of the towns and dis¬ 
tricts interested* 
Although it may appear from the above case that 
children of the smaller communities suffer in the educational 
advantages that are available to them, later enactments have 
removed most of the obstacles. Under General Laws, Chapter 
71, section 4 to 10, there are adequate provisions for high 
school education for any resident of the Commonwealth. The 
re-imbursement provisions made it possible for every town 
to care for the attendance of any worthy child at a high 
school, even if the town does not maintain such a school and 
is not required to do so* 
There is no authority in a school committee to accept 
pupils who reside out of~the state, and the promise of a non¬ 
resident parent to pay tuition for his child in a Massachusetts 
school is not enforceable. 
Inhab. of Haverhill v. Gale 
103 Mass. 104 
28 
The duties of the Parents. 
The primary responsibility for school attendance rests 
upon the parent. Although there are occasional instances of 
waywardness and habitual truancy in which even the parents 
are unable to exert Influence, we see the wisdom of the law 
which insists on the responsibility of the parent for regular 
school attendance. A parent may be penalized under G. L. 
Chapter 76, Section 2 (Terc. Ed.) for neglect in this essen¬ 
tial parental duty. 
Commonwealth v. Prank Roberts 
159 Mass. 372 (1893) 
Complaint under St. 1890, c. 384, alleging that the 
defendant on September 1, 1890, and from that day continually 
to November 5, 1891, at Fitchburg, ”dld have under his control 
I 
a child between the age of eight years and fourteen years, to 
wit, Mary Roberts of the age of eleven years, and then and 
there during all of said time did neglect to cause said child 
to attend any public day school at said Fitchburg for at least 
twenty-eight weeks during the school year, the said public 
schools of said Fitchburg being kept open that length of time 
during said time, and the said child not having attended for 
a like period of time a private day school approved by the 
school committee of said Fitchburg, and said child not having 
been otherwise instructed for a like period of time in the 
branches of learning required by lav/ to be taught in the public 
schools, and said child not having already acquired the 
branches of learning required by law to be taught in the pub- 
29. 
lie schools, and said child’s physicial and mental con¬ 
dition not being such as to render such attendance inexped¬ 
ient or impracticable* 
Trial in the Superior Court, before Bishop, J*, who re¬ 
ported the case for the determination of the Supreme Judicial 
Court, in substance as follows:- 
It was proved "that at the time alleged in the complaint 
the defendant had under his control a daughter named Mary 
Roberts, between the ages of eight and fourteen years, and 
that he neglected to cause her to attend a public day school 
in said Fitchburg at the time and for the period alleged in 
the complaint." 
The defendant offered to show that for a like period of 
time with the period alleged in the complaint, during the time 
alleged in the complaint, the said Mary Roberts had been in¬ 
structed in the branches of learning required by law to be 
taught in the public schools in a private day school not 
approved by the school committee of said Fitchburg, applica¬ 
tion to approve said private school having been made to said 
school committee and refused; and asked the judge to rule that 
these facts, if proved, brought the case within the exceptions 
mentioned in the statute. The judge declined so to rule, and 
excluded the evidence. 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty. If the evidence 
offered should have been admitted, the verdict was to be set 
. 
aside; otherwise it was to stand. 
Allen, J. The penalty imposed by St. 1890, c. 384, is 
30, 
not incurred ”lf such child has attended for a like period 
of time a private day school approved by the school committ¬ 
ee of such city or town, or if such child has been otherwise 
instructed for a like period of time in the branches of learn¬ 
ing required by law to be tau^t in the public schools, or 
has already acquired the branches of learning required by law 
to be taught in the public schools”* The words, ”if such 
child has been etherise instructed for a like period of time 
in the branches of learning required by law to be taught in 
the public schools”, were first enacted in St. 1889, c. 464, 
by way of substitution for the words, ”if such child has 
been otherwise furnished for a like period of time with the 
means of education”, which words were in the earlier statutes. 
Pub. Sts. c. 47, s. 1, St. 1873, c. 279, s. 1. Gen. Sts. c. 
41, s. 1. 
The great object of these provisions of the statutes 
has been that all the children shall be educated, not that they 
shall be educated in any particular way. To this end public 
schools are established, so that all children may be sent to 
them unless other sufficient means of education are provided 
for them. If a child has in any manner already acquired the 
branches of learning required by law to be taught in the pub¬ 
lic schools, the law does not compel any further instruction. 
If he has not acquired them, the law requires that he be in¬ 
structed in them for the specified time each year. Sending 
a child to a private day school approved by the school comm- 
/ 
31 
Ittee is enough to comply with the requirements of the law, 
without further inquiry* The Pub. Sts. c. 47, s. 2, pre¬ 
scribe what private schools may be so approved. But if the 
person having a child under his control, instead of sending 
him to a public school or to a private day school approved 
by the school committee, prefers to have him instructed 
otherwise, it will be incvimbent on him to show that the 
child has been Instructed for the specified time in the re¬ 
quired branches of learning, unless the child has already 
acquired them. This permits instruction in those branches 
in schools or academies situated in the same city or town, 
or elsewhere, or instruction by a private tutor or governess 
or by the parents themselves, provided it is given in good 
faith and is sufficient in extent. If the school committee 
has not approved of a particular school, or has expressly 
refused to approve of it, then the person having control of 
a child, if he sends the child to that school, must take the 
responsibility of being able to prove that he has been suffi 
ciehtly and properly instructed there. He has no such re¬ 
sponsibility if he sends, the child to a private day school 
approved by the school committee. 
The evidence which was excluded should have been ad¬ 
mitted. 
Verdict set aside. 
32. 
COMMOMWEALTH V. GREEN 
268 Mass. 585 (1929) 
Sanderson, J. Hie defendant was convicted upon a 
complaint charging him with failing to send to school his 
two children, between the ages of seven and fourteen years, 
for seven specified days within a period of six months 
next before the making of the complaint. The only excep¬ 
tion was to the denial of the defendant's motion that the 
jury be directed to return a verdict of not guilty. 
Testimony offered by the Commonwealth tended to prove 
that the defendant refused to have the children vaccinated 
as required by law, and failed to send them to school. The 
defendant admitted that he refused to have his children 
vaccinated and that he knew the authorities would not allow 
them to attend school unless vaccinated. 
G. L. c. 76, s. 1, as amended by St. 1921, c. 463,- re¬ 
quires every child between seven and fourteen years shall, 
subject to 3. 15, attend a public day school in the town or 
some other day school approved by the school committee during 
the entire time that public schools are in session. G. L. 
c. 76, s. 2. G. L. c. 76, a. 15 provides an unvaccinated 
child shall not be admitted to a public school except upon 
presentation of a physician’s certificate. In the case at 
bar, no such certificate was obtained and upon the testimony 
of the defendant the physical condition of the children was 
such that a certificate could not properly have been given# 
33* 
- The requirement for vaccination has been held to be 
constitutional. Commonwealth v. Pear 183 Mass. 242. 
Jacobson v. Comm. 197 U. S. 11. The defendant's view 
cannot affect the validity of the statute nor entitle him 
to be excepted from its provisions. By statute, vaccination 
is made a condition precedent to the right of a child to 
attend a public school. Spofford v. Carleton 238 Mass. 528. 
The defendant's sole defence to the complaint seems to be 
that because of his religious belief and conscientious 
scruples concerning vaccination he should not be held to have 
Incurred the penalty of the statute for falling to send his 
children to school. But he cannot thus avoid this penalty 
even if their failure to attend school was based upon this 
gro\md alone. Comm. v. Plaisted 148 Mass. 375. It was his 
own act which kept the children in the class ineligible for 
school attendance. 
In Hammond v. Hyde Park 195 Mass. 29, the court held that 
the school committee was justified in excluding an unvaccinated 
child during an epidemic, even though the child had a certifi¬ 
cate from a physician that the child could not be vaccinated 
without grave injury to his health. Such a certificate will 
permit attendance in school under noimal conditions. 
In Spofford v. Carleton 238 Mass. 528 the school committ¬ 
ee was upheld in its action of requiring constant renewal of 
such a certificate. The school committee required that the 
certificate be renewed several times during the year. 
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Carletoii B. Nicholls, Jr. v. Mayor and School 
Committee of Lynn 
297 Mass. 65 
Rugg, C. J. This petition for a writ of mandamus was 
submitted without evidence upon agreement that the facts 
stated in the petition and answer are taken to be true, the 
answer to control in case of inconsistencies* The single 
justice reported the case without decision with the state¬ 
ment that he should not exercise his discretion against the 
Issuance of the writ if in other respects the petitioner was 
entitled to it. The object of this petition is to secure 
reinstatement as a pupil in a public school from which the 
petitioner has been expelled* 
The essential facts are these: The petitioner is about 
eight years old, a resident of Lynn, and in his third year 
as a pupil in the public schools of that city. During all 
this time and for many years theretofore, there was in effect 
a rule as to the conduct of the schools in Lynn of this tenor: 
"Rule 18. Salute To The Flag.—The following salute to the 
flag shall be given in every school at least once a week and 
at such other times as occasion may warrant; I pledge alleg¬ 
iance to the Flag of the United States of America and to the 
Republic for which it stands, one Nation indivisible, with 
liberty and justice for all." During his first two years in 
school, the petitioner joined with his teachers and room class¬ 
mates in the salute to the flag and the recitation of the 
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pledge of allegiance* After the opening of the school in 
1935, it was observed that the petitioner, while standing 
during the salute and the recitation of the pledge, was 
otherwise taking no part therein. Upon inquiry it was said 
by the petitioner and his father that the petitioner would 
not take part in the ceremony "because he was being called 
upon to adore the flag and to bow down to the flag and that 
according to his religious views, he could only adore and bow 
down to Jehovah." Courteous requests by the teacher and prin¬ 
cipal of the school failed to change the decision of the pe¬ 
titioner not to participate in the ceremony. On September 
30, 1935, there was repeated a refusal by the petitioner to 
join in the salute to the flag and the pledge of allegiance 
as a part of the opening exercises of the school, but he re¬ 
mained seated and refused to rise. The father of the petition¬ 
er was present at the time. After due notice to the petitioner 
and his father, a hearing was held before the respondents on 
October 8, 1935, on the question why the petitioner should not 
be expelled from school because of his conduct. The father 
was present and was represented by counsel, who made an explana¬ 
tion of the reasons for the refusal of the petitioner to salute 
the flag and to recite the pledge of allegiance in that they 
constituted an act of adoring and of bowing down to the flag, 
which is contrary to the religious beliefs of the petitioner# 
The respondents as members of the school committee of Lynn 
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then voted to exclude the petitioner from attending the 
Lynn public schools "until he, of his own free will, shall 
be willing to subscribe to the laws of the Lynn School 
Committee and Commonwealth of Massachusetts*" This petition 
was then seasonably brought. 
By G* L* (Ter. Ed.) c. 71, s 37, the school committee 
is given general charge of all the public schools in Lynn and 
is authorized to make regulations as to attendance therein. 
In Leonard v. School Committee of Springfield, 241 Mass. 325, 
329, 330, it was said: "The school committee is an independ¬ 
ent body, entrusted by law with broad powers, important 
duties and large discretion.•.The school committee may make 
all reasonable rules and regulations for the government, dis¬ 
cipline and management of the schools under their charge." 
In holding that a child of immoral character might be excluded 
from the public schools, it was said in Sheiman v. Charlestown, 
8 Cush. 160, 167, that "the whole tone and tenor of the laws 
demonstrate, that it was the intention of the legislature to 
make the public schools a system of moral training, as well 
as seminaries of learning." The decipline of the classroom 
may be maintained. Hodgkins v. Rockport 105 Mass. 475. 
Pupils of such intellectual capacity and weakness of mind 
as to interfere with the progress of others may be excluded. 
Y/atson v. Cambridge 157 Mass. 561. Rules to promote health 
may be enforced. Hammond v. Hyde Park, 195 Mass. 29. Secret 
societies may be suppressed. Antell v. Stokes 287 Mass. 103. 
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The discretion of the school committee was diminished by 
St. 1935, c. 268, amending G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 71, s. 69. 
It was thereby enacted that the school committee shall pro¬ 
vide flags for each schoolhouse under itscontrol and that 
^ flag of the United States ”shall be displayed in each 
assembly hall or other room in each sm h schoolhouse where 
the opening exercises on each school day are held. Each 
teacher shall cause the pupils under his charge to salute 
the flag and recite in unison with him at said opening ex¬ 
ercises at least once each week the "Pledge of Allegiance 
to the Flag.” Failure to comply with this mandate by the 
school committee or by a teacher is made punishable by fine. 
No penalty is imposed on pupils for refusing to participate 
in the ceremony. The respondents are required to cause to 
be given instruction in the public schools in American his¬ 
tory and civics, the Constitution of the United States, and 
the duties of citizenship. All instructors of youth are re¬ 
quired to "exert their best endeavors to impress on the 
minds of children and youth committed to their care and in¬ 
struction the principles of piety and justice and a sacred 
regard for truth, love of their country, humanity and unlver 
sal benevolence.G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 71, s. 1, 2, 30. 
The general rule of the school committee of Lynn, al¬ 
ready quoted, is within the power conferred by G. L. (Ter. 
Ed.) c. 71, s. 37, and is expressly authorized by St. 1935, 
c. 258. The latter statute established no penalty for a 
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discTDediGntJ pupil, but is directed to the school committee 
and to the teacher. Power to enforce the rule is implied 
in the grant of power to Establish it. It necessarily follbws 
that, if said c. 258 and the rule are valid, the school comm¬ 
ittee was acting within its jurisdiction in excluding the 
petitioner from attending school. Antell v. Stokes 287 Mass. 
103. .Sherman v. Charlestown 8 Cfush. 160, 164. Hodgkins v. 
Rockport 105 Mass. 475 Hammond v. Hude Park 195 Mass. 29. 
Watson V. Cambridge 157 Mass. 561. The rigidity of this 
rule extends no latitude to pupils who refuse to obey it be¬ 
cause of religious objections. Said c. 258 is clear in its 
command that “each teacher shall cause the pupils under his 
charge to salute the flag and recite in unison with him “the 
pledge of allegiance. 
The public obligation to provide for general education 
is imposed by c. 5, s. 2, of the Constitution of this Common¬ 
wealth in these impressive words: “Wisdom and knowledge, as 
well as virtue, diffused generally among the body of the peo¬ 
ple, being necessary for the preservation of their rights 
and liberties; and as these depend on spreading the oppor¬ 
tunities and advantages of education in the various parts of 
the country, and among the different orders of the people, it 
shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all 
future periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the interests 
of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries of them; 
especially the university at Cambridge, public schools and 
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grammar schools in the towns; to encourage private socie¬ 
ties and public institutions, rewards and immunities, for 
the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, 
trades, manufactures, and a natural history of the country; 
to countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity 
and general benevolence, public and private charity, indusf 
try and frugality, honesty and punctuality in their deal¬ 
ings; sincerity, good humor, and all social affections, and 
generous sentiments, among the people.” In the performance 
of the obligation thus imposed on the Commonwealth, it seems 
to us within the competency of the General Court to enact a 
statute like c. 258, requiring the flag salute and the 
pledge of allegiance. Oliat is a ceremony clearly designed to 
Inculcate patriotism Euid to instill a recognition of the bless¬ 
ings conferred by orderly government \mder the Constitution of 
the State and nation. The study of those instruments is a 
proper subject for instruction in the public schools. It is 
plain that the Republic and the State undertake to establish 
liberty and to provide Justice for all within their borders 
in accoi*dance with standing laws. Tb.e flag is a symbol of 
those aims of government. It is Important for all who attend 
the public schools to know these facts and to appreciate these 
advantages. An understanding of these matters enables citizens 
to comprehend and to assert their rights and to seek and obtain 
their safety and happiness. 
As Justification for his conduct, the petitioner appeals 
to art. 2 of the Declaration of Ri^ts of the Constitution of 
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this Commonwealth. It is there provided that *^no subject 
shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, 
liberty, or estate, for worshipping God in the manner and 
season most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; 
or for his religious profession or sentiments; provided he 
doth not disturb the public peace, or obstruct others in 
their religious worship." He invokes, also, s. 1 of art. 18 
of the Amendments to the Constitution, as found in art 46 
of the Amendments; "No law shall be passed prohibiting the 
free exercise of religion." He further relies on G. L. 
(Ter. Ed.) c. 75, s. 5, to the effect that "No child shall be 
excluded from a public school of any town on account of race, 
color or religion." 
Neither the Constitution of this Commonwealth nor that 
of the United States contains any definition of religion. 
Reynolds v. United States 98 U. S. 145, 162. Nevertheless, 
a deep reverence for religion permeatds several parts of the 
Constitution of this Commonwealth. That Constitution guaran¬ 
tees "absolute freedom as to religious belief and liberty 
\inrestrained as to religious practices, subject only to the 
conditions that the public peace must not be disturbed nor 
others obstructed in their religious worship or the general 
obligations of good citizenship violated." Opinion of the 
Justices 214 Mass. 599, 601. 
In Davis v. Season 133 U. S, 333, 342, it wassaid; "The 
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tern •religion* has reference to one’s views of his relations 
to his Creator, and. to the obligations they impose of rever¬ 
ence for his being and character, and of obedience to his 
will...With man’s relations to his Maker and the obligations 
he may think they impose, and the manner in which an impress¬ 
ion shall be made by him of his belief on those subjects, no 
interferences can be permitted, provided always the laws of 
society, designed to secure its peace and prosperity, and the 
morals of its people, are not interfered with." The flag 
salute and pledge of allegiance here in question do not in 
any Just sense relate to religion. They are not observances 
which are religious in nature. They do not concern the views 
of any one as to his Creator. They do not touch upon his re¬ 
lations with his Maker. They impose no obligations as to re¬ 
ligious worship. They are wholly patriotic in design and pur¬ 
pose. 
The petitioner has made no disturbance in school and has 
simply stood mute during the ceremony of flag salute and pledge 
of allegiance, except that he remained seated on the single 
occasion on September 30, 1936, when his father was present. 
He refused to recognize the rule. It is assumed that the state¬ 
ment of beliefs of the petitioner made by him is genuine and 
true and constitutes the ground of his conduct. 
It has been assumed by both sides in the argument of the 
case at bar that the petitioner and his parents belong to the 
group known as "Jehovah Witnesses." A member of that group. 
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as stated in the brief of the petitioner, through a literal 
reading of the Bible, and especially of the first two 
Connnandments as found in Exodus XX, entertains the belief 
that he "must express reverence to God alone and not to the 
flag, which is not the symbol of God.” According to his be¬ 
lief, a salutation is equivalent to an act of reverence or 
adoration, or idolatry, and in violation of the Commandments 
of Scripture. The pledge of allegiance to the flag, as set 
forth in the rule of the school committee and referred to in 
said c. 258, is an acknowledgment of sovereignty, a promise 
of obedience, a recognition of authority above the will of the 
Individual, to be respected and obeyed. It has nothing to do 
with religion. 
The salute and pledge do not go beyond that which, accord¬ 
ing to generally recognized principles, is due to government. 
There is nothing in the salute or the pledge of allegiance 
which constitutes an act of idolatry, or which approaches to 
any religious observance. Itnioes not in any reasonable sense 
hurt, molest, or restrain a human being in respect to worshipp¬ 
ing God” within the meaning of words in the Constitution. The 
rule and the statute are well within the competency of legis¬ 
lative authority. They exact nothing in opposition to reli¬ 
gion. They are directed to a justifiable end in the conduct of 
education in the public schools. The practice of the petition¬ 
er was in contravention of them. It was said in Reynolds v. 
United States 98 U. S. 145, 166: ”Laws are made for the govern- 
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ment of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere 
religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.” 
In Fraina v. United States 255 Fed. Rep. (C.C.A.) 28, 36, 
the statement occurs: ”the most profound religious convic¬ 
tion that compliance with statute is wrong will not by law 
save any one from conviction...for violating that statute.” 
In Spiller v. Woburn 12 Allen 127, a pupil sought damages 
for her alleged illegal expulsion from school. A rule had 
been passed that the schools should be opened each morning 
with reading from the Bible and prayer, and that during the 
prayer the scholars should bow their heads; with a proviso 
that any pupil whose parent so requested should be excused 
from taking part in the ceremony. The father of the plain¬ 
tiff refused to make such request, but instructed her to re¬ 
fuse to bow her head. As a result, she was expelled from 
school. Judgment was rendered for the defendant and the rule 
was upheld as a reasonable exercise of the power of the school 
committee. In the opinion, at page 129, it was stated: ”We 
do not mean to say that it would be competent for a school 
committee to pass an order or regulation requiring pupils to 
confom to any religious rite or observance, or to go through 
with any religious foims or ceremonies, which were inconsis¬ 
tent with or contrary to their religious convictions or con¬ 
scientious scruples...But we are unable to see that the regu¬ 
lation with which the plaintiff was required to comply can be 
justly said to fall within this category.” 
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In Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California 
293 U. S. 245, relief was sought against refusal to allow 
citizens to attend a State university except upon condition 
of taking military training, to vdiich objection was made on 
religious and conscientious grounds. It was said at pages 
261, 262; "Appellants assert—unquestionably in good faith— 
that all war, preparation for war, and the training required 
by the university, are repugnant to the tenets and discipline 
of their church, to their religion and to their consciences 
♦ ..There need be no attempt to enumerate or comprehensively to 
define what is included in the ‘liberty* protected by the due 
process clause. Undoubtedly it does include the right to en¬ 
tertain the beliefs, to adhere to the principles and to teach 
the doctrines on which these students base their objections to 
the order prescribing military training.. .They are seeking ed¬ 
ucation offered by the State and at the same time insisting 
that they be excluded from the prescribed course solely upon 
grounds of their religious beliefs and conscientious objections 
to war, preparation for war and military education. Taken on 
the basis of the facts alleged in the petition, appellants* 
contentions amount to no more than an assertion that the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a safeguard of 
‘liberty* confers the ri^t to be students in the state univer¬ 
sity free from obligation to take military training as one of 
the conditions of attendance. Viewed in the light of our de¬ 
cisions that proposition must at once be put aside as untenable.” 
That decision appears to us to support in general the con¬ 
tentions of the respondents. It stamps with disapproval the 
contention of the petitioner that any ri^t secured to him 
by the Federal Constitution or its Amendments has been infringed. 
There is nothing at variance with the conclusion here reached 
in Meyer v. Nebraska 262 U. S. 590, and Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters 268 U. S. 510* 
The result is that, 'in our opinion, the rule and said c* 
268 are not invalid and the petitioner fails to show that any 
of his rights have been invaded. 
Matters of policy or wisdom are not open for our consider¬ 
ation. Our decision is confined to the question of law whether 
the pe titioner is entitled to the writ. 
Petition dismissed. 
The **flag-salute” cases which have arisen in the past few 
years are similar in many respects to the religious freedom 
problem in school administration as represented by Spiller v. 
Wobum 12 Allen (94 Mass.) 127, and the vaccination cases. In 
all these situations we find a stubborn reluctance to do many 
of the things that the majority of our citizens find advisable 
manifestations of cooperation. There are times when our tol¬ 
erance and patience with these non-conformists is apparently 
wasted, but that is the very point where tolerance is most needed. 
If we permit conscientious objectors to accept a substitute 
for military service, and if we permit atheists or Quakers to 
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give an affirmation rather than an oath in court proceedings, 
surely there must be some arrangement that can be made for 
the group who cannot conscientiously salute the flag. 
Fortunately, our court decided in Commonwealth v. John¬ 
son that the children who refuse to salute the flag and are 
urged to refuse by their parents, cannot be sent to a train¬ 
ing school. 
”It does not follow that, in the absence, as here, of 
other facts tending to show misconduct or misbehavior, vio¬ 
lation of such a regulation of Instruction in the public 
schools of a town, adopted under the terms of a statute that 
applies in terns only to children in public schools, and im¬ 
poses no penalty even upon such children for failure to par¬ 
ticipate in the required exercise, imports such misconduct 
or misbehavior on the part of a child persistently failing 
to comply with such regulation as warrants a finding that such 
a child is an ^habitual school offender” subject to being 
committed to a training school, within the meaning of G. L. 
(Ter. Ed*) c. 77, s. 5. No implication of power to disci¬ 
pline a child in this manner is necessary for the enforce¬ 
ment of the statute or the regulation. An intention that a 
child ^ould be so disciplined is not lightly to be attributed 
to the Legislature, in the absence of express provision there¬ 
for.” 
Commonwealth v. Johnson 
309 Mass. 476 
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The Duties of the Child 
In the administration of our schools, it is essential 
that the school committee have control over the child for 
the maintenance of good discipline and morale. There is 
seldom any question of the necessity of such control inso- 
\ 
far as ordinary discipline problems are concerned. However, 
some great difficulties have arisen when there has been a 
question by parents as to possible invasion by the schools 
of the parental sphere of influence. Adopting the thou^t 
of the great Justice Holmes who said of a disappointed civil 
service candidate ”The plaintiff has the constitutions! right 
to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be¬ 
come a policeman”, we must agree that a pupil has no consti¬ 
tutional right to run the school. Nor has the parent the 
right to dictate courses of study, selection of teacher for 
his child, and classification of the child in the school. 
Our court has been positive in upholding the power of the 
school committee to enforce its reasonable rules on all matters 
affecting school life, and upholds exclusion for persistent 
failure to abide by the rules. 
For the habitual offender in the schools, there is the 
provision of training schools. 
Antell V. Stokes et al 
287 Mass. 103 (1934) 
Eight petitions for writs of mandamus, filed in the 
Supreme Judicial Court for County of Essex on February 15, 
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1934. The material facts were agreed on and are stated 
in the opinion. Cases were consolidated and were reserved 
and reported for determination by the full court. 
Rugg, C. J. Several petitions for writs of mandamus 
were consolidated for purposes of hearing by the single jus¬ 
tice, who then reported the cases without decision. Each 
petitioner prays for a writ to compel the respondents, the 
school committee of the City of Haverhill to reinstate her 
as a pupil in the High School of that city. The material 
facts are agreed. The school committee passed a rule entitled 
"Regulations on Fraternities and Sororities" of the tenor 
following; "On and after May 16, 1933 no student in the High 
School shall be pledged to or join a secret organization com¬ 
posed wholly or in part of high school pupils unless said or¬ 
ganization is approved by the Superintendent and Principal of 
the High School, nor shall a student member or student members 
of such secret organizations as now exist pledge, initiate, accept 
or attempt to pledge, initiate or accept a fellow student into 
membership. The wearing of jerseys, sweaters, caps, or other 
conspicuous evidence of membership in an unapproved secret or¬ 
ganization now existing shall file with the principal: a. Name 
of organization, b. Lists of all student members, c. Dates and 
places of all meetings, d. Programs, dates and places of all , 
house pai*ties or other gatherings, whether occurring during 
school year or in short vacations. The penalty for violations 
of any of the above regulations is exclusion from the Haverhill 
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School. The principal of the High School may adopt such 
other rules and penalties as seem to him best for the close 
regulation of such fraternities and sororities as now exist 
until they shall pass out of existence and such rules shall 
be considered additions to the regulations given above*” 
The principal of the High School prepared registration 
blanks to be signed by pupils on which was printed a copy of 
this regulation and to which was added the sentence: ”My sig¬ 
nature signifies that I have carefully read the school comm¬ 
ittee’s regulations and promise on my honor to observe them”. 
Each pupil was expected to sign this blank. No one refused. 
The only misconduct on the part of the petitioners who were 
excluded from school was violation of the rule and of the 
pledge• 
The question is whether the school committee had power 
under the law to pass and enforce this rule. The relevant 
statutes are in General Laws (Ter. Ed.) c. 71; by s. 37 it is 
provided that the school committee "shall have general charge 
of all the public schools.'..It may determine, subject to this 
chapter the number of weeks and the hours during which such 
schools shall be in session, and may make regulations as to 
attenciance therein”; and by s. 47, ”The committee may super¬ 
vise and control ail athletic and other organizations com¬ 
posed of public school pupils and bearing the school name or 
organized in connection therewith”* 
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Education ofyouth was provided at public expense and 
nourished with anxious solicitude through the colonial and 
provincial period of our history. The duty to maintain and 
' cherish public schools was declared in the Constitution, c. 
i 5, s.. 2. Money raised by taxation for the support of public 
I schools has been segregated to those conducted under ”the 
order and superintendence” of approved officials of the town 
f or city by Article 40 of the Amendments to the Constitution. 
1 The jealous care of the General Court has always clothed 
I municipal officers with adequate authority to encourage the 
{ highest practicable efficiency of thesystem of public educa- 
1 tion. The words quoted from the statutes are of wide import. 
They confer an ample power. For the promotion of the interests 
of the pupils and of all the people they have been broadly 
f construedby the court for nearly a century. In the absence of 
other limitations, they include the power to determine within 
: reason what pupils shall be received and what pupils shall be 
rejected. The general principle that the control and superin¬ 
tendence of the school committee extend to the regulation of 
' 
attendance by the pupils upon the public schools has been illus- 
\ trated by application to many specific instances. Cushing v. 
I Newburyport 10 Metcalf 508; Alvord v. Chester 180 Mass. 20; 
k Morse v. Ashley 193 Mass. 294; Wulff v. Wakefield 221 Mass. 427; 
E Leonard v. School Committee of Springfield 241 Mass. 385. 
i 
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As matter of interpretation the words of these sections 
warrant the adoption of the mile here assailed. It would 
be difficult to frame a more comprehensive grant of power in 
this connection than that to supervise and control all organ¬ 
izations composed of public school pupils and established in 
connection with the public schools. Discussion cannot clari¬ 
fy these unambiguous words. The history of section 4? con- 
fimns this view. By St. 1906, c. 251, the power was conferred 
upon the school committee to supervise and control school 
athletic organizations. By St* 1919, c. 292, s. 4, this power 
was enlarged so as to Include other organizations as well as 
those purely athletic. The legislative intent to cede power 
embracing every kind of such organization could hardly be more 
clear* 
The rule of the school committee here attacked was well 
within the grant conferred by s. 47. The power in this par¬ 
ticular as set forth in s. 47 manifestly extends to organiza¬ 
tions designed to be operative away from the school premises 
and outside school hours. This is not an invasion of the do¬ 
main reserved exclusively to home and family. Formal associa¬ 
tions of pupils in connection with a public school possess 
possibilities of genuine harm to the reputation of the school 
and to the studious habits and personal character of the mem¬ 
bers. These factors Intimately concern the general welfare 
in connection with the public schools. They properly may be 
regulated by rules adopted pursuant to legislative sanction. 
The rule is not invalid because it forbids the solici¬ 
tation and initiation of new members and does not at one 
stroke abolish such societies. To provide for their gradual 
extinction by the efflux of time is not unreasonable and is 
within the scope of the legislative grant of power. Further 
provisions of the rule as to filing information touching the 
name of the organization, lists of members, dates, places 
and programs of meetings are incidental to general supervision 
and control of such organizations. 
I 
No point arises on the record as to the authority attempt¬ 
ed to be delegated to the principal of the hi^ school to adopt 
further rules and penalties for the close regulation of such 
existing organizations. It does not appear to have been exer¬ 
cised. The petitioners have no complaint in that regard. In 
any event it is merely incidental to the main purpose and sub¬ 
stance of the rule and is easily separable from other parts of 
it. There is no occasion to consider its validity. Plainly 
the principal was authorized to prepare the registration blanks 
and to request signatures to them by the pupils. 
The penalty of expulsion from school for violation of the 
rules does not exceed the pov/er conferred by s. 47. The power 
to make rules would be vain without the capacity to annex 
reasonable penalties for their violation. Rules adopted by 
the constituted authorities for the governance of public 
schools must be presumed to be based upon mature deliberation 
and for the welfare of the community. A pupil who persistently 
53. 
violates such, rules, especially after having made an express 
promise to obey them, may be excluded from the school by the 
school committee acting in good faith. No personal right 
stands superior to the public welfare in this particular. 
Sheman v. Charlestown 8 Cush.(62 Mass.)160 
Spiller V. Woburn 12 Allen (94 Mass.)127 
Hammond v. Hyde Park 195 Mass. 29 
Hodgkins v. Rockport 105 Mass. 475 
No right guaranteed by the Federal Constitution is in¬ 
fringed by the statute as thus interpreted. Waugh v. Univer¬ 
sity of Miss. 237 U. S. 589. 
In each case the entry may be. 
Petition dismissed. 
There is a remedy for unlawful exclusion of a child from 
school, and wherever a child is excluded without a hearing, 
there can be recovery against the town. However, if a hearing 
is held, and a vote of exclusion is made by the school committ¬ 
ee, acting in good faith, there can be no recovery. 
In Morrison v. Lawrence 181 Mass. 127 shearing was held, 
but the school committee refused to pemit pupils of the school 
to be compelled to give testimony in regard to matters that 
occurred in the school. However, the committee would allow 
such pupils to make statements if they chose to do so. The 
court refused to hold that there was any bad faith in the re¬ 
fusal to permit such examination, and agreed that for the main¬ 
tenance of morale, and for the protection of the children, this 
was probably the best action that the committee could have 
taken. 
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Pauline Jones v* City of Fitchburg 
211 Mass. 66 (1911) 
Tort for unlawful exclusion of Plaintiff from defendant's 
public schools. Writ dated May 9, 1908. 
In the Superior Court the case was tried before Bell, J* 
Pound for plaintiff in #1,075. Reduced to #600* by Judge. 
Defendant alleged exceptions. 
The general mangement of the public schools having been 
conferred on the school committee, the plaintiff's exclusion 
was not unlawful unless they acted in violation of the provis¬ 
ion of R. L. c. 44, ss. 7,8, under which the action is brought. 
Bishop V. Rowley 165 Mass. 460. Morrison v. Lawrence 186 Mass. 
456. R. L. s 42, s, 27. At the grammar shhool where she 
attended, a course in civil government had been prescribed in 
which the functions of the various officers required by the 
defendant’s system of municipal administration were exemplified 
by the pupils and while in the performance of the duty of a 
policeman, to which she had been assigned, differences arose be 
tween the plaintiff and the principal* The aspersions upon 
her honesty, which the jury could find caused the difficulty, 
were finally decided by him to be without foundation. The 
plaintiff, however, desired to be relieved frcm the office, and 
upon his refusal to grant the request, declined to act further, 
when he informed her that without compliance she would not be 
permitted to attend school. The order was enforced, and the 
interviews and correspondence in which the plaintiff and her 
father, the principal and the superintendent of schools, who 
also acted as secretary of the school ccanmittee, participated 
55. 
having failed to adjust the controversy, a written applica¬ 
tion was made by the plaintiff’s father asking that, in accord¬ 
ance with s. 7, a statement in writing be furnished giving 
the reasons for his daughter’s exclusion. The reply returned 
must be read in connection wlththe undisputed evidence. It 
appears that through a subordinate committee of visitation, 
whose report was before them, the full committee had been 
informed of the circumstances. The board consequently knew 
that the plaintiff had been denied readmission and deprived 
of the benefit of the public schools because of alleged mis¬ 
conduct. They also must have been aware that their vote then 
passed to sustain the principal established a condition which 
could be teimlnated only by the acknowledgment of the plain¬ 
tiff that her conduct was unjustifiable, although upon an im¬ 
partial Inquiry by the committee she mi^t have been exoner¬ 
ated, or a less severe penalty might have been imposed. It 
was open to them upon receiving the application to have order¬ 
ed a hearing and decided the question whether she had been 
guilty of insubordination, and their decision affirming the 
order, if made in good faith, would have been final. Morrison 
V. Lawrence 186 Mass. 456. But, instead, the committed voted 
to inform him, that the plaintiff had been suspended for re¬ 
fusing to obey the principal’s directions and that she could 
return to school at any time upon acceding to the terms to 
which we have referred. The Jury were warranted in finding 
that the severance of the plaintiff from the school, even if 
characterized in the vote as a suspension, operated, and 
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was intended to operate for an indefinite period, and in 
effect amounted to a permanent exclusion, which could not 
he Justified unless preceded by the hearing required by 
sect. 8. Spiller v. Woburn 12 Allen 127, Camig v. Carr 
167 M. 544. If found to be peimanent, the exclusion was un¬ 
lawful for the reasons stated, and the defendant's requests 
were properly denied. 
Exceptions overruled. 
Emma Wulff v. Inhabitants of Wakefield 
221 Mass. 427 (1915) 
Tort under R. L. c. 44, s. 7 for the alleged unlawful 
expulsion of the plaintiff from schools of Wakefield. Writ 
dated May 29, 1912. 
In the Superior Court the case was tried before Dana, J. 
The material evidence is described in the opinion. At the 
close of the evidence, the Judge ordered a verdict for the 
defendant and reported the case to this court for determina¬ 
tion. 
Pierce, J. There was evidence tending to show that for 
some reason, presixmably because of the burden of work, the 
teacher selected a pupil as an assistant to perform in his 
stead the purely mechanical work of comparing the answers to 
problems as worked out by pupils with the correct answers 
contained in a “key book". It happened that a certain prob¬ 
lem submitted by the plaintiff to the assistant for examina¬ 
tion was marked "wrong". The plaintiff worked upon it as 
best she could during a week and a half and then submitted it 
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the same answer to the teacher, who went over it and called 
it correct. There was evidence that as a consequence of this 
error of the assistant, the plaintiff "worried, was nervous 
and lost her appetite and sleep...She reported the incident 
to her mother and her stepfather, Mr. and Mrs. Kleeman.” 
Kleeman protested against the manner of correcting the papers 
in turn to the teacher, the superintendent of schools, and to 
the principle of the high school. • 
Pending a hearing before the school committee, Kleeman re¬ 
quested that the plaintiff's work be corrected by the teacher 
only and not by a fellow pupil. He also "protested against 
the method of correcting the work and told the committee of the 
ill effect that the situation created by the method was having 
on the plaintiff's health". This request or petition was re¬ 
fused, after hearing, and thereupon the plaintiff requested 
that she be excused from the work. 
Pending these hearings she did not attend to the work 
and after the decision of the committee was communicated to 
her she continued to absent herself althougji required to resume 
work on pain of suspension. Remaining obdurate she was formally 
suspended from school. Kleeman later filed a formal request to 
the same end and was granted a hearing, but the request was de¬ 
nied. A verdict was directed at the close of the plaintiff's 
case and hence the plaintiff is entitled to the view of the ev¬ 
idence most favorable to her contention. 
The hearings apparently were infomal, and we get a 
glimpse now and then of a disposition to make fun of the em- 
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barrassment and possible peculiarities of the stepfather; 
but on the whole there is no reason to find that there was 
not a fair hearing and a decision rendered in good faith. 
Ihe real and vital question is not whether the plaintiff 
was guilty of misconduct in refusing to attend her class, but 
whether a parent has the ri^t to say a certain method of teach¬ 
ing any given course of study is to be pursued. The question 
answers itself. Were it otherwise, should several parents 
hold diverse Opinions all must yield to one or confusion and 
failure inevitably follow. The determination of the proced¬ 
ure and the management and direction of pupils and studies in 
this Commonwealth rests in the wise discretion and sound judg¬ 
ment of teachers and school committee, whose action in these 
respects is not subject to the supervision of this court. 
R. L. c. 42, ss. 27 and seq. Hodgkins v. Rockport 105 Mass. 
475, Watson v. Cambridge 157 Mass. 561; Morse v. Ashley 193 
Mass. 294; Hanion v. Hyde Park 195 Mass. 29. 
The case at bar is one purely of administrative detail 
and its exercise violates no legal ri^t of pupil or parent. 
The plaintiff was without right in requrlng that the principal 
personally should attend to the supervision of her individual 
work, perhaps to the neglect of more important duties. 
While constrained to this decision, we cannot refrain 
from the expression of disapproval of the practice of setting 
a rival pupil in judgment upon the work of an eager and zealous 
competitor. However honest that pupil may be, a mistake or 
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error of decision inevitably leads to suspicion and often to 
charge of intentional wrong. 
Judgment on the verdict. 
So Ordered. 
Watson V. City of Cambridge 
157 Mass. 561, (1892) 
Tort, to recover damages for the exclusion of the 
plaintiff by the school committee. Verdict for plaintiff. 
Exceptions alleged. 
Khowlton, J. The records of the school committee of the 
defendant city set forth that the plaintiff in 1895 was oc¬ 
cluded from the schools "because he was too weak-minded to de¬ 
rive profit from Instruction". He was afterwards taken again 
on trial for two weeks, and at the end of that time again^ ex¬ 
cluded. The records further recite that "it appears from the 
statements of teachers who have observed him, and from the 
certification of physicians, that he is so weak in mind as not 
to derive any marked benefit from instruction, and further, that 
he is troublesome to other children, making uncouth noises, pinch¬ 
ing others, etc. He is also found unable to take the ordinary 
decent physical care of himself." The evidence at the trial 
tended strongly to show that the matters set out in the records 
were true. 
"The defendant requested the court to rule that, if the 
facts were true which are set forth in the records of the comm¬ 
ittee as the cause of the exclusion of the plaintiff from the 
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public schools-, the determination of the school committee 
thereon, acting in good faith, was final, and not subject to 
revision in the courts.” The court refused so to rule, and 
submitted to the jury the question whether the facts stated, 
if proved, showed that the plaintiff»3 presence in school 
”was a serious disturbance to the good order and discipline of 
the school." 
The exceptions present the question whether the decision 
of the school committee of a city or town, acting in good faith, 
in the management of the schools, upon matters of fact directly 
affecting the good order and discipline of the schools, is .final 
so far as relates to the rights of pupils to enjoy the priv¬ 
ileges of the school, or is subject to revision by a court. 
In Hodgkins v. Rockport 105 Mass. 476, it appeared that the 
school committee, acting in good faith, excluded the plaintiff 
from school on account "of his general persistence in disobeying 
the rules of the school, to the Injury of the school." 
Of the plaintiff*3 acts of misconduct it is said, in the 
opinion in that case, that "whether they had such an effect upon 
the welfare of the school as to require his expulsion, was a ques 
tion within the discretion of the committee, and upon which their 
action is conclusive." The principles there laid down are de¬ 
cisive of the present case. It was found by the presiding jus¬ 
tice that the alleged misconduct of the plaintiff in that case 
was not mutinous or gross, and did not consist of a refusal to 
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obey the cominands of the teachers, or of any outrageous 
proceeding, but of acts of neglect, carelessness of pos¬ 
ture in his seat and recitation, tricks of playfulness, 
inattention to study, and regulations of the school in 
minor matters. The only difference between the acts of 
disorder in that case and in this is that in this they re¬ 
sulted from the incapacity and mental weakness of the plain¬ 
tiff, while in the other they were willful or careless, the 
result in part of youthful exuberance of spirits and impa¬ 
tience of restr&ihtor control. In their general effect 
upon the school they were alike, and the reasons for giving 
the school committee, acting in good faith, the pcwer to 
decide finally a question affecting so vitally the rights 
and interests of all the other scholars of the school,are 
the same in both cases. 
Under the law, the school committee ”have the general 
charge and superintendence of all the public schools in the 
town" or city. Pub. Sts, c, 44 s 21. The management of 
the schools involves many details, and it is Important that 
a board of public officers dealing with these details and 
having jurisdiction to regulate the internal affairs of the 
schools, should not be interfered with, or have their con¬ 
duct called in question before another tribunal, so long 
as they act in good faith within their jurisdiction. 
Whether certain acts of disorder so seriously interfere with 
the school that one who persists in them, either voluntarily 
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or by reason of imbecility, should not be permitted to re¬ 
main in the school, is a question which the statute makes 
it their duty to answer, and if they answer honestly in an 
effort to do their duty, a jury composed of men of no special 
fitness to decide educational questions should not be per¬ 
mitted to say that their answer is wrong. Spear v. Cummings 
23 Pick 224, at 226. 
When the exclusion from school is for some other reason 
than misconduct, a hearing is not required by statute. Thus, 
a pupil who is incompetent to continue with the class may be 
re-classified, Barnard v. Shelburne 216 Mass. 19. A child 
who will be a bad influence upon other children because of 
moral weakness may be refused admission to the school. 
Sherman v. Charlestown 8 Cush. (62 Mass.) 160. A child may 
be excluded from school for uncleanliness, Carr v. Dighton 
229 Mass. 304. The habitually tardy child may be suspended, 
Russell V. Lynnfield 116 Mass. 365. 
Chapter III 
The School Committee 
63. 
Extent of Control over School Affairs 
The educational policy of our Commonwealth is deter¬ 
mined legislatively by the General Court. It would be 
-t 
within the province of that body to place in a State de- 
pai*tment exclusive control of the schools. In fact, much 
of the responsibility for the enforcement of the statutory 
law of education is placed in the Commissioner of Educa¬ 
tion. However, throughout the history of our Commonwealth, 
the General Court has chosen to delegate a large part of 
its power in education to the local school committees. The 
State Department of Education functions as a very active 
division of the administrative government in promoting and 
developing educational programs, in administering the reim¬ 
bursement provisions of the law, and in training teachers. 
The local school committees are entrusted with the general 
charge of all the public schools. The election of teachers, 
and the other details of the school management are the re¬ 
sponsibilities of the school committee. 
Leonard et als v. Springfield 
241 Mass. 325 (1922) 
Bill in Equity under G. L. c. 40, s. 53, filed in the 
Supreme Judicial Court on June 21, 1921, by nineteen taxable 
inhabitants of the City of Springfield, seeking an injunction 
restraining the school committee from diverting money of the 
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city from particular school purposes to which it was appro¬ 
priated in the budget of 1921, as adopted by the -city council 
and devoting it to other school purposes included within gen¬ 
eral headings of the budget* 
The material facts were agreed to and are described in 
the opinion. The suit was reserved by Pierce, J., for deter¬ 
mination by the full court upon the pleadings and an agreed 
statement of facts. 
Ihiggi C. J. This is a suit in equity by the mayor and 
more than ten other taxpayers of the city of Springfield 
against the school committee, auditor and treasurer of that 
city. The object of the suit is to restrain the school 
committee from diverting money of the city from particular 
school purposes to which it was appropriated in the budget 
of 1921, as adopted by the city coimcil, and devoting it to 
other school purposes included within general headings of 
the budget. 
The relevant facts are that, in response to request by 
the mayor of Springfield, the school committee seasonably sub 
mitted estimates for expenses of the public schools, which, 
amongst numerous other matters. Included an Increase in the 
compensation to be paid many teachers, as well as salaries 
of additional teachers. The mayor in his budget as trans¬ 
mitted to the city council named a sum smaller than that 
asked by the school committee, intending to include salaries 
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of additional teachers at the rate previously fixed by 
the school comniittee but intending not to make provision 
for increases in salaries beyond those arising under gener¬ 
al rules established by the school committee. The estimate 
transmitted by the school committee to the mayor and the bud¬ 
get submitted by the mayor to the city council were arranged 
under fifteen main headings, so far as the present controversy 
is concerned. The city council failing to approve or dis¬ 
approve any items in the budget within sixty days, it became 
operative as the city’s budget under the law. There after 
the school committee, in order to provide money for the in¬ 
creases in salaries upon which they had determined and for 
which they had asked, but which the mayor had refused to in¬ 
clude in the budget, voted to eliminate "summer schools," 
which was one heading or item in the budget, to discontinue 
ten out of a larger number of kindergarten schools thereby 
diminishing by several thousand dollars the amount required 
to'^maintain "kindergarten," another separate heading or item 
in the budget, and to curtain expenses in other schools con¬ 
stituting distinct headings or items in the budget. The re¬ 
sult of the several votes of the school committee was not. 
to exceed the total appropriation for schools but to change 
the application of some of the items in the budget. 
Tbe precise question to be decided is whether the school 
committee has power thus to carry out its policy as to the 
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management of the school system or whether it is bound by 
the action of the mayor and city council to the items set 
forth in the budget without power to modify or change them 
in any substantial particular. Ohat question concerns the 
relative powers and duties of the mayor and city council on 
the one side and of the school committee on the other side 
under the provisions of law relative to the budget as applied 
to the administration of the public schools system. The gov¬ 
erning statutes are C. L. c. 44, relating to "Municipal Fin¬ 
ance,” G. L. c. 71, relating to "Public Schools,” and the 
city charter of Springfield concerning the school committee. 
The cinicial provision of G. L. c. 44, s. 52, which, omitting 
its exceptions and quoting only parts pertinent to the fonn 
of city government established by the charter of Springfield, 
is in these words: "Within sixty days after the annual organ¬ 
ization of the city government•• .the mayor.. .shall submit to 
the city council the annual budget of the current expenses of 
the city...The budget shall consist of an itemized and de¬ 
tailed statement of the money required, and the city council, 
by a majdrity vote, shall make such appropriations in detail, 
clearly specifying the amo\int to be expended for each particu¬ 
lar purpose j but the budget shall not be in such detail as 
to fix specific salaries of employees under the direction of 
boards elected by the people, other than the city council. 
The city council may reduce or reject any item, but, without 
67. 
the approval of the mayor. •. shall not Increase any item 
in or the total of a budget, nor add any item thereto..the 
city officials, when so requested by the mayor, shall sub¬ 
mit to him forthwith in such detail as he may require esti¬ 
mates for the next fiscal year of the expenditures of their 
departments or offices under their charge, which shall be 
transmitted to the city council...if the council fails to 
approve or disapprove any item in the budget, as submitted 
by the mayor.. .within sixty days after its receipt thereof, 
such item shall, without any council action, become a part 
of the budget for the year, and the sum named shall be avail¬ 
able for the purpose designated...” 
The charter of the city of Springfield provides that 
the ”school committee shall have the care and superintendence 
of the public schools, and shall have all the powers, and per¬ 
form all the duties, of town school committees.” St. 1852, c. 
94, s. 11. 
The school committees of cities and towns as enacted by 
G. L. c. 71 s. 37, ”shall have the general charge of all the 
public schools” and, by is 38, ”shall elect and contract with 
the teachers of the public schools.” 
The slight verbal changes made in these sections of the 
General Laws, as compared with corresponding sections of ealier 
statutes, wrought no alteration in meaning and did not modi¬ 
fy the pre-existing law. Main v. County of Plymouth 223 Mass. 
66,69, Commonwealth v. Kozlowsky 238 Mass. 379, 387* 
It was said in 1846 by Chief Justice Shaw in Cushing 
V. Newhuryport 10 Met. 508, at page 511: "The establish¬ 
ment of schools for the education, to some extent at least, 
of all the children of the whole people, is not the result 
of any recent enactment; it is not the growth even of our 
present constitutional government, or the provincial govern¬ 
ment which preceded it, but extends back two hundred years, 
to the early settlement of the colony. Indeed, the establish¬ 
ment of popular schools is \mderstood to have been one of the 
objects for which powers were conferred on certain associa¬ 
tions of persons living together in townships, enabling 
them to regulate and manage certain prudential concerns in 
which they had a common interest." The policy of the Common¬ 
wealth from early times has been to establish a board elected 
directly by the people separatefrom other governing boards of 
the several municipalities and to place the control of the 
public schools within the jurisdiction of that body unhamper¬ 
ed as to details of administration and not subject to review 
by any other board or tribunal as to acts performed in good 
faith. 
The general statutory provisions as to the powers of the 
school committee, to which reference has been made, have been 
in substance the same for many years. They had been inter¬ 
preted by numerous decisions and had acquired a well settled 
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meaning long before the enactment of the law providing 
for a budget. Without reviewing these decisions one by 
one, it is enough to state summarily their essential conclu¬ 
sions. 
Ihe school committee is an independent body, entrusted by 
law with broad powers, important duties and large discretion. 
The obligation to select and to contract with teachers Implies 
examination as to their fitness and of necessity carries with 
j 
it the authority to fix the compensation to be paid. It would 
be vain to impose upon the school committee responsibility for 
excellence of the instruction to be afforded to pupils and to 
deprive them of the power to determine the salaries of tea¬ 
chers. There is much of self sacrifice and devotion to the 
common welfare among teachers in the public schools. But, 
nevertheless, the character of service to be obtained de¬ 
pends to a considerable degree upon the compensation offered. 
The full and appropriate discharge of their duties by school 
committees requires ample power to select competent teachers. 
The Legislature, moved by obvious and strong reasonsj; has 
vested the school committee with the absolute and uncondition¬ 
al power to agree with teachers upon their salaries to the 
end that high standards may be secured and maintained in the 
education of the youth of the Commonwealth. In the exercise 
of their honest judgment on the question of salaries for 
teachers, the school committee are not restricted to the 
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amounts appropriated. For the time during which schools 
must be kept by law the municipalites must pay such salaries 
as may be fixed by the school committee. To take this pov/er 
from the school committee would break up the long established 
system of our law in regard to public schools. The only sup¬ 
ervision which the city council or towns can exercise over 
the school committee is to vote to close the schools after 
they have been kept the length of time specified by the law. 
The school committee may make all reasonable rules and regu¬ 
lations for the government, discipline and management of the 
schools under their charge. This includes a determination 
within the bounds set by the statutes of the subjects to be 
taught and the nature of the schools to be maintained and 
the exercise of discrimination, insight and wisdom in the 
election of teachers and in the general supervision of the 
school system, with all the incidental powers essential to 
the discharge of their main functions, Batchelder v. Salem 
4 Cush 599. Spiller v. Woburn 12 Allen 127. Charlestown v. 
Gardner 98 Mass. 587. Kimball v. Salem 111 Mass. 87. McKenna 
V. Kimball 145 Mass. 555. Morrison v. Lawrence 181 Mass. 
127. Morse v. Ashley 193 Mass. 294. Hammond v. Hyde Park 195 
Mass 29. Barnard v. Shelburne 216 Mass. 19. Whittacker v. 
Salem 216 Mass. 383 (483). See Day v. Greenfield 234 Mass. 
31. 
The statutory provisions under which these decisions 
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were rendered have been substantially the same for a long 
time* They have been re-enacted without change in success¬ 
ive revisions of the laws. The interpretation of their 
terms in the numerous decisions which have been cited may 
be presumed to have been adopted by the General Court. 
Welch V. Boston 211 Mass. 178, 185. King v. Thissell 222 
Mass. 140, 141. 
This body of statutory and common law regarding a 
matter of universal Interest and profound importance to the 
public well was established and widely known before the bud¬ 
get law came into existence. The budget law must be con¬ 
strued and applied in the light of this history and with re¬ 
ference to this background of school law. The budget law, 
now G. L. c. 44, s. 32, already quoted, was enacted first by 
St. 1913, c. 719. It was entitled ”An Act Relative to Muni¬ 
cipal Indebtedness.** It was founded upon a report of a joint 
special committee of the General Court on municipal finance. 
The joint order of 1912 providing for that committee author¬ 
ized an investigation of municipal indebtedness and assess¬ 
ment and collection of taxes and kindred matters. The re¬ 
port of that committee is comprehensive concerning the sub¬ 
ject of municipal assessment and collection of taxes, and 
the incurring and paying of municipal indebtedness and allied 
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subjects. There is nothing in it directly touching the 
public school system. Its words convey no express intima¬ 
tion of a purpose to effect any change in the powers of the 
school committee. If there is modification, it flows wholly 
from implication. 
The municipal Indebtedness act of 1913, with its pro¬ 
visions for a budget, was highly important legislation. It 
was an Innovation in the fiscal affairs of cities governed 
by a mayor and city council. It was calculated to cultivate 
municipal thrift and to discounage current expenditures at 
the cost of future taxation. The payment of present charges 
out of the present tax levy is one obvious purpose of the 
act. Another manifest design was ”to set rigid barriers 
against expenditures in excess of appropriations, to prevent 
the borrowing of money for current expenses, to confine the 
making of long time loans strictly to raising money for per¬ 
manent improvements, and in general to put cities upon a 
sound financial basis so far as these ends can be achieved 
by legislation.” Flood v. Hodges 231 Mass. 252,256. Shannon 
V. Cambridge 231 Mass. 322. While by the municipal indebted¬ 
ness act with .its budget provisions general and special laws 
inconsistent therewith are repealed with exceptions not here 
material; yet it cannot be construed as reaching outside its 
proper territory over into the well recognized field of public 
school education equally established and retained as a sep¬ 
arate statutory domain, and obliterating the functions of the 
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school committee in important particulars* There are com¬ 
bined in the General Laws the pre-existing provisions re¬ 
specting public schools and the budget system of municipal 
finance, both substantially in the phrases theretofore em¬ 
ployed in the statutes. This demonstrates that there was 
no thought in the minds of the framers of that compilation 
of laws, or of the legislators in enacting it, that there 
was conflict between the two or that they could not stand 
together as practically workable statutes. To support the 
contention of the plaintiffs would put the school committee, 
hitherto at least for almost a century an independent body 
charged with duties vital to the welfare of socletyV wholly 
under the domination of the mayor and city co-uncil in essen¬ 
tial particulars. As matter of statutory construction, such 
a revolution in the management of the public school system 
cannot be effected merely by doubtful implication from a 
statute enacted to accomplish a quite different end. Duggan 
V. Bay State Street Railway 230 Mass. 370,374. 
It is to be noted that no question here is raised as to 
an attempt by a school committee to spend more than a total 
appropriation made for the support of the public schools. 
The school committee only assert a right to fix the salaries 
of teachers in confoimity to their own sound discretion with¬ 
out being restricted in this regard to particular items sped 
fled in the budget. That contention Is sound. The statutes, 
interpreted as an haimonious body of laws in the light of our 
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history and traditions as to the public school system, 
confer upon the school comraitee of Springfield power to es¬ 
tablish the salaries of teachers within the total amounts 
appropriated by the budget, according to their best judg¬ 
ment of public needs, as set forth in G. L. c. 71, and other 
laws governing the conduct of the public school. 
The case at bar is distinguishable in its controlling 
statutory provisions from School Committee v. Mayor of Cam¬ 
bridge 233 Mass. 6, and Simpson v. Marlborough 236 Mass. 210. 
The request of the school committee for fees of its soli¬ 
citor to be taxed as costs against the plaintiffs is denied. 
This is not an appropriate case under our practice for the 
application of that principle. Higginson v. Fall River 226 
Mass. 423. Ten taxpayers frequently invoke the aid of the 
court under G. L. c. 40, s. 53, purely for the public wel¬ 
fare and not to enforce a private interest. Even taxable 
costs often have not been charged against defeated plain¬ 
tiffs \mder that statute. Puller v. Mayor of Medford 224 
Mass. 176. Lee v. Lynn 223 Mass. 109. See in this connect¬ 
ion Barrage v. County of Bristol 210 Mass. 299; Sears v. 
Nahant 215 M^ss. 234; Frost v. Belmont 6 Allen 152; Stiles 
V. Municipal Coimcil of Lowell 233 Mass. 174. 
Bill dismissed without costs. 
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It now seems clear that the remedy in case of in- 
sufflclent appropriation by the governing body of the wotn 
or city must be by petition to the Superior Court under 
Chapter 71, Section 34. This section was amended in 1939, 
so as to create a remedy for such failure to appropriate 
7 
that might reasonably be applied. The former remedy was 
really penal in that it would impose an unreasonable bur¬ 
den upon a town. 
The Municipal Finance Act of 1913, Chapter 64, Section 
32, provides for the arrangement of the budget in cities, 
and there has been some question as to the power of the 
school committee over the salaries of teachers and other 
financial arrangements* This question was cleared somewhat 
in Leonard v. Springfield 241 Mass. 325, where the court 
held positively for the right of the school committee to 
control the schools*..”It would be vain to Impose upon the 
school committee the responsibility for the excellence of 
the Instruction to be afforded to pupils and to deprive them 
of the power to determine the salaries of teachers* * .While by 
the municipal indebtedness act, with its budget provisions 
general and special laws inconsistent therewith are repealed, 
yet it cannot be construed as reaching outside its proper 
territory over into the well-recognized field of public school 
education, equally established and retained as a separate 
statutory domain, and obliterating the functions of the school 
committee in important particulars.” 
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Fiduciary Nature of the Office 
Traditionally, the school committeeman has occupied 
an elective office that is as far removed from politics as 
public opinion and the careful rulings of the courts could 
keep it. The office is without compensation and the best 
citizens have been willing to serve under a system that main¬ 
tains the independence of the schools from politics. A 
school committeemian is ineligible for any school position 
within the public schools# 
Edward W. Barrett v. City of Medford 
254 Mass. 384 (1926) 
Pierce, J. Ihis is an action to recover for services 
rendered as school physician, or‘*raedlcal lnspector**of the 
City of Medford, from September 1, 1923 until August 1, 1924, 
eleven months at $60.00, a total of $660. The answer, in 
addition to a general denial, alleges that ”the appointment 
(of the plaintiff) was ultra vires, against public policy 
and otherwise void.” The case was heard in the Superior 
Court without a jury, on an ”Agreed Statement of Pacts”. 
The judge found for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed 
to this Court. 
The pertinent facts are that on November 12, 1917, the 
plaintiff was appointed by the school committee of the defend - 
ant city temporary medical inspector for all the schools. On 
June 14, 1920, his appointment was made permanent and placed 
under the civil service. The appointment was made under G. 
c. 71, s. 53, and previous similar statutes. Thereafter, he 
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continued to serve as medical inspector by appointment of 
the school committee and under the civil service at a month¬ 
ly salary of $60*00 until the bringing of this action. Dur¬ 
ing all this period he was a member of the school committee, 
elected every three years, but took no part officially as 
a member of said school committee in his appointment by 
said school committee as such “medical inspector”. After 
September 1, 1923 owing to the refusal by the mayor to approve 
the payroll item covering the plaintiff's salary as medical 
Inspector, he no longer received a salary for such services. 
Nevertheless, he continued to perform the duties of medical 
inspector and to serve as a member of the school committee. 
On August 1, 1924, he brought this action against the city 
for $660. the amount he would have received to date had his 
salary as medical inspector been continued and paid# 
“The duties of the medical Inspector are regulated 
partly by statute, (G.L. c. 71, ss. 54,55) partly by the 
school committee and partly by conditions as they arise." 
Under this statute he examines all school children referred 
to him, he examines teachers. Janitors and school buildings; 
he grants employment certificates to children who are en¬ 
titled to work; and as a part of his duties, at the discretion 
of the school authorities, he examines girls who play basket 
ball and boys who play hockey. The school committee, under 
G. L. c. 71, s. 59, elects and fixes the compensation of a 
superintendent of schools, who “shall be the executive officer 
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of the committee, and under its general direction”. It 
appoints a school physician (herein called medical Inspector) 
under s. 53‘and fixes his compensation. Under St. 1904, c. 
173, G. L. c. 71, s. 52, ”Bo member of aschool committee in 
any town shall be eligible to the position of teacher, or 
superintendent of schools therein.” Under the rules of the 
school committee, the superintendent or the executive officer 
of the school committee, s. 59 supra, has general care and 
supervision of the schools and nominates all principals, sup¬ 
ervisors, teachers. Janitors,...and other school employees” 
and makes recommendations ”to the school committee regarding 
their duties, salaries, and dismissal.” The charter or ordin- 
ginces of the defendant city do not forbid the school committee 
from appointing one of its own members as medical inspector 
of schools and the rules of the school committee of the de¬ 
fendant city make no reference to it. 
Having in mind that a member of Cither branch of a city 
council or of a municipal board of a city is not permitted to 
be personally interested directly or indirectly in a contract 
made by the city council, or other branch thereof, or by such 
board, or by authority derived therefrom, in which the city is 
an interested party, G. L. c. 268, s. 9; that no ”meraber of the city 
council shall, during the term for which he was chosen be eli¬ 
gible to any office the salary of which is payable by the city,” 
G. L. c. 39, s. 8; that a board of health of a city, who are 
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authorized to appoint a quarantine physician under an or¬ 
dinance giving him a compensation fixed by the city council, 
may not appoint one of their own members such quarantine phy¬ 
sician, Gaw V. Ashley 195 Mass. 175; that no member of a 
school committee shall be eligible to serve as teacher or 
superintendent in the public schools, St. 1904, s. 173; we 
think a school committee, in the absence of a statute per¬ 
mitting it, cannot elect one of themselves to the salaried 
office of school physician. The duties he is to perfoim as 
physician are incompatible with the supervisory duties which 
as a member of the committee he should exercise over the in¬ 
cumbent of the office of school physician. Consistently he 
cannot be master and servant. 
Again, under the rules of the Committee and G. L. C. 71, 
3. 59, the superintendent of schools, under the direction of 
the school committee, is the**executive officer of the comm^ 
ittee** who, among other services, has the duty to nominate 
for election **all principals, supervisors, teachers, janitors 
...and other school employees, make recommendations to the 
school committee regarding their duties, salaries, and dis¬ 
missal**. It is to be further observed that the superintend¬ 
ent of schools may hold his office by the deciding vote of 
the member he may subsequently nominate for school physician, 
with whcM an accompanying recommendation of a stated salary 
for the incumbent of that office. 
Judgment for the defendant. 
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Lynn 375 M&ss. 358 (1931) a dismissed 
teacher who later sought election to the school committee 
and was elected could not be re-appointed to her teaching 
position. By becoming a member of the school committee 
she had rendered herself ineligible for re-instatement as 
a teacher, even though her petition for a writ of mandamus 
was filed before the election. 
See also Wood v. Cambridge 369 Mass. 67 for a treat¬ 
ment of the requirement that a city school committeeman may 
not hold other elective office for compensation within the 
period of his elected terra. 
The Superintendent is the Executive Officer 
Edward J. Russell v. John P. Gannon 
381 Mass. 398 (1933) 
Two Petitions, filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Berkshire on September 36, 1931, for v/rlts of 
mandamus, and described in the opinion. 
C. J. We deal first with the case of Russell v. 
Gannon. This petition for writ of meuidamus is brought to com¬ 
pel the respondent as superintendent of schools of Pittsfield 
to recognize the petitioner as assistant superintendent of 
schools. The relevant facts are that the school committee 
in 1931 voted that the office of assistant superintendent of 
schools be created and that the petitioner, then a teacher 
in the high school, be assigned to that office. There after 
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the school committee requested the respondent to recommend 
some one to be assistant superintendent of schools. He re¬ 
commended some one other than the petitioner. The school 
committee rejected the person so recommendod and again 
elected the petitioner. The single justice ruled as requested 
by the petitioner that the school committee had power to create 
the position of assistant superintendent of schools by majority 
vote, and to assign to such position a person already on the 
teaching force not recommended by the superintendent after 
the latter had recommended another person, and ordered the 
writ to issue. The exceptions of the respondent bring the 
case here. 
The dominating characteristic of the statutes relating 
to public schools is that the school committee of the sever¬ 
al cities and towns (in the absence of some special provision) 
"shall have general charge of all the public schools" and 
"shall elect and contract with the teachers of the public 
schools." G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 71, s. 37, 38. It is provided 
also by G, L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 71, s. 59, that the school comm¬ 
ittee of a city such as Pittsfield "shall employ a superin¬ 
tendent of schools and fix his compensation. A superintendent 
employed under this section.•.shall be the executive officer 
of the committee, and under its general direction, shall have 
the care and supervision of the public schools, shall assist 
it in keeping its records and accovints and in making such re¬ 
ports as are required by law, and shall recommend to the 
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committee teachers, textbooks, and courses of study.” • 
It is plain from these three sections and from the general 
tenor of said c. 71 that the Legislature has placed the final 
power as to the management of schools in the school committee. 
While the school committee may always seek the superintendent *s 
advice, and in some instances must have it, as precedent to 
action, Duffey v. School Committee of Hopkinton 236 Mass. 5, 
still the power rests with the school committee. There is 
nothing in the statutes or in the customs as to the conduct 
of public schools that requires the action of the school comm¬ 
ittee to be controlled by, the opinion of the superintendent. 
Although his duties are highly important, they do not with re¬ 
spect to essential features of school management override the 
authority of the school committee. Boody v. School Committee 
of Barnstable 276 Mass. 134. Sheldon v. School Committee of 
Hopedale 276 Mass. 230, 235. If in a city like Pittsfield the 
school committee decides that an assistant superintendent of 
schools is necessary for the economical and efficient adminis¬ 
tration of the public schools, it has the power to create such 
a position... .It may act on its own sound judgment as to what 
is required by the public welfare, and contrary to advice from 
any source, even from the superintendent of schools. It is 
still the master and not the servant. This conclusion is in 
harmony with the body of statutes governing the public school 
system of the Commonwealth and with the uniform current of 
judicial decisions...To adopt the contention of the respondent 
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would be subversive of the principles there established. 
Exceptions overruled. 
The Municipality’s Liability is Limited 
Jane P. Sweeney v. City of Boston 
309 Mass. Ill (1941) 
Report by Good, J., of an action of tort tried before 
him in the Superior Court. 
Dolan, J. This is an action of tort to recover compen- 
) 
sation for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff as 
a result of falling down a stairway in a public school build¬ 
ing in the City of Boston, known as the “Teachers* College and 
Cflrls* Latin School Building." The case was tried to a jury 
and at the close of the plaintiff’s case the judge granted the 
defendant’s motion for a directed verdict for the defendant, 
subject to the plaintiff’s exception. The jury returned a 
verdict for the defendant, as directed, and the case comes 
before us on the report, of the judge, the parties having stip¬ 
ulated that if the verdict for the defendant was properly 
ordered, judgment shall be entered accordingly, otherwise 
judgment ^all be entered for the plaintiff in a stated sum. 
The evidence would warrant the jury in finding the follow 
ing facts: On Jvine 21, 1937, one Sullivan applied to the dir¬ 
ector of extended use of the public schools of the school 
committee of Boston for permission to use two halls and four 
rooms in the school building, before referred to on October 
22, 1937, for a "bridge, whist and beano” entertainment. The 
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application was received by the director pursuant to s. 385 
of the "Rules of the School Committee and Regulations of the 
Public Schools of the City of Boston, "adopted under the au¬ 
thority of St. 1912, c. 195, s. 1, as amended by Spec. St. 
1916, c. 86. The director approved the application and sent 
Sullivan a letter on September 8, 1937 stating that a charge 
of $33.45 was made for the proposed use of the school accomo¬ 
dations. Sullivan paid that sum to the director’s secretary, 
who transmitted it to the office of the business manager of the 
committee who turned it over to the city collector. All funds 
received by the committee are turned over to the city collector 
and by him to the city treasurer, are put to the credit of the 
school committee, and are all used for purposes of the school 
committee. The sum charged in the present case was based upon 
certain schedules adopted by votes of the school committee. 
Only $3.51 of the total charge was not expended for expenses 
V 
Incurred by the committee in connection with the use of the 
building on the night of the entertainment. 
After paying the charge made, Sullivan procured a tem¬ 
porary entertainment license on September 20, 1937, for "bridge, 
whist and beano" on October 27, 1937, from the licensing div¬ 
ision at City Hall, paying therefor a fee of $2. Tickets were 
sold for the affair in advance,and could be procured at the 
door of the school on the ni^t of its occurence, by any mem¬ 
ber of the public who should choose to purchase one. 
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The plaintiff, an elderly woman, had purchased a ticket 
in advance. Immediately after passing through the main door 
of the building, she stopped in the entrance to the vestibule 
proper, located about eight feet distant, to take her ticket 
out of her bag. There was a throng of people there, and as 
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the "crowd was going along" she took one step to the right and 
fell down a stairway, which was about eighteen Inches from 
the door through which she had entered. An electric light 
bulb affixed to the wall over the landing of this staircase 
was not lighted and the stairway was unguarded at the point 
where the plaintiff fell. Further facts which the jury could 
have found relative to the accident and its proximate cause 
need not be recited, since even if it be assumed that the em¬ 
ployees of the school committee who were on duty in the build¬ 
ing that night (the custodian of the building and assistants) 
were negligent, that the plaintiff’s injuries resulted there¬ 
from, and that she was in the exercise of due care, she cannot 
recover. 
St. 1912, c. 195, s. 1, as amended by Spec. St. 1916, c. 
86, reads as follows: "For the purpose of promoting the use¬ 
fulness of the public school property of the city of Boston, 
the school committee of that, city may conduct such educational 
and recreative activities in or upon school property under its 
control, and shall allow the use thereof by individuals and 
associations, subject to such regulations as the school comm- 
1 
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Ittee may establish., for such educational, recreative, so¬ 
cial, civic, philanthropic and similar purposes as the 
committee may deem to be for the interest of the community; 
provided, that such use shall not interfere or be inconsist¬ 
ent with the use of the premises for school purposes.** 
The school committee of the City of Boston is a board 
of public officers whose duties are prescribed by statute, 
and in the execution of its duties its members act not as 
agents of the city but as public officers in the performance 
of public duties. McKenna v. Kimball 145 Mass. 555,566. 
The appropriations it may make are fixed by statute. St. 
1936, c. 224. It empowers concerning the taking of land and 
construction of new school buildings thereon, as well as al¬ 
terations, repairs and equipment, are set forth in St. 1929, 
c. 351, under which the commissioners of school buildings and 
the department of school buildings are made responsible to the . 
committee rather than to the mayor and city council, or either. 
By St. 1875, c. 241, s. 5, it is provided in part that the 
committee **shall appoint janitors for the school-house, fix 
their compensation, designate their duties and may discharge 
them at pleasure.** The amendment of this section by St. 1933, 
c. 121, does not affect that provision. While the city charter 
of the defendant city confers broad powers upon the mayor and 
city council, there is nothing therein that confers upon them 
control of the committee in the performance of the duties im¬ 
posed upon it as a board of public officers, or of its agents 
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or servants in the execxition of those duties. Provisions 
in St. 1936, c. 224, under which the mayor is given a veto 
power over appropriations voted by the committee (which 
may be overridden by the committee by the same vote as is 
required to pass them in the first instance), provisions of 
the city charter whereby certain employees of the school 
committee are defined as employees of the city for pension 
purposes, and those requiring a list to be furnished annually 
to the city auditor of all persons paid by the city or county, 
and similar provisions of the city charter (St. 1909, c. 486, 
as amended), do not affect the status of the school committee as 
an independent board of public officers. A reading of the 
charter as a whole discloses a recognition therein of the 
school committee as an Independent body set apart from the 
departments of the city itself. There is nothing in conflict 
with this view in Trustees of Public Library v. Rector of 
Trinity Ch\irch, 263 Mass. 173, 176. 
Although the title to the school building in question 
is in the city, by force of the statutes the building is in 
the sole control of the committee. The plaintiff’s counsel 
concedes in his brief that the building involved was "under 
the control and general charge of the school committee," and 
not subject to "municipal regulation and Inspection." The 
authority to permit the extended use of the school buildings, 
under which the peimlssion for use was granted in the present 
case, is conferred by statute upon the school committee, not 
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upon the city government or any of its officers or agents. 
In exercising that authority, whether for profit or other¬ 
wise, the members of the committee acted as public officers, 
for whose torts or those of its agents or servants liability 
cannot be imposed upon the city, which had no voice in or 
control over the matter. 
The decisive fact is that the school committee of the 
city of Boston are not officers or agents of the city itself, 
but public officers. It is the established law of this 
Commonwealth that in the absence of express stattitory pro¬ 
visions to the contrary a city is not liable for the torts of 
public officers or for those of their agents or servants 
acting in the discharge of public duties imposed upon such 
officers. Manners v. Haverhill 155 Mass. 165, 17. Mahoney 
V. Boston 171 Mass. 427,430. Attorney General v. Stratton, 
194 Mass. 51, 58. Galassi Mosaic & Tile Co. v. Boston 295 
Mass. 544, 550. Ryder v. Lexington 503 Mass. 281, 287, 289. 
» 
Adie V. Mayor of Holyoke 303 Mass. 295, 300. Ryder v. 
Taunton 306 Mass. 154, 159. It is likewise settled that a 
“municipality can exercise no direction or control over one 
whose duties have been defined by the legislature.** D*Addario 
V. Pittsfield 301 Mass. 552,558, and cases cited. Breault v. 
Auburn 303 Mass. 424, 428. Gibney v. Mayor of P^ll River 
306 Mass. 561,565. It follows from what has been said that 
judgment must be entered for the defendant in accordance with 
the directed verdict. 
So ordered. 
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Chapter IV 
The Teacher 
The Principal is a Teacher in Charge 
Laura M* Boody v. School Committee 
of Barnstable 
276 Mass. 134 (1931) 
Petition for a writ of mandamus, filed in the Supreme 
Judicial Court for the County of Barnstable on December 4, 
1930, and afterwards amended, described in the opinion. 
The only provisions of our statutes which limit the 
authority of school committees to discharge teachers, to 
reduce their salaries, or to change the duties assigned to 
them are contained in G. L. c. 71, ss. 39-44, both inclu¬ 
sive, as amended by St. 1921, c. 293, and c. 420, s. 4. No 
question of reduction of salary is involved here. No pro¬ 
vision with regard to change of duties exists, \mless it be 
involved in the provisions with reference to dismissal. For 
the purposes of the retirement fund for the benefit of teach¬ 
ers in the public schools, G. L. c. 32, s. 6, as amended by 
St. 1925, c. 228, s. 1, a ”Teacher” is defined as ”any per- 
son employed by one or more school committees.. .on a full 
time basis as a teacher, principal, supervisor, or superin¬ 
tendent in the public day schools in the Commonwealth. • .”This 
is the only definition of teacher made by pur statutes so far 
as has been brought to our attention. G. L. c. 71, s 42, as 
amended by St. 1921, c. 293, provides that school committees 
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"may dismiss any teacher, but in every town except Boston 
no teacher or superintendent, other than a union or district 
superintendent, shall be dismissed unless by a two-thirds 
vote of the whole ccamnittee. In every such town a teacher 
or superintendent employed at discretion under the preced¬ 
ing section shall not be dismissed unless at#•••30 days. 
Neither this nor#.##No teacher or superintendent..lawful 
suspension followed by dismissal". The language makes mani¬ 
fest that the dismissal contemplated is a complete separation 
from the schools of the town; and is not a mere change in 
assignment of duties resulting in lessened authority or scope 
of employment. No limitation is placed by this statute on 
the power of a majority of the school committee to change 
or to lessen the duty assigned to a teacher. Althou^ G. L. 
c. 71, s. 4, requires towns of a certain size to maintain 
high schools to be "kept by a principal and such assistants 
as may be needed" and s. 5, in providing for reimbursement 
of expense by the Commonwealth, speaks of payment "for a 
principal and for each teacher", we do not interpret the 
law as creating a class of principals as distinct from tea¬ 
chers. Principals are teachers who are entrusted by the 
school committee with special duties of direction of manage¬ 
ment, which may be changed or taken away as the school comm¬ 
ittee by a majority vote decides. 
The i*uling requested based on an assertain of rights by 
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contract; could properly be denied in the circumstances. 
Distinguishing Pollars v. Revere 249 Mass. 525, lack 
of good faith# Here, good faith. 
* 
Exceptions overruled.^ 
The Committee can. Change the Duties of a Teacher 
Although the superintendent, as the executive officer 
of the school committee holds an office from which he cannot 
be demoted during his elected term or after he has been 
placed ”on tenure”, without a hearing, the teacher iuho is 
placed in charge of a school under the title of principal may 
be demoted by the school committee. It is also within the 
powers of the school committee to change or vary the class 
duties of a teacher# 
John W. McDevitt v. School Committee of the City 
of Malden 
1937 A. S. 1253 
Report by Donahue, J., without decision, of mandamus 
proceedings in the Supreme Judicial Court for the County of 
Suffolk. 
Qua, J. The petitioner had been elected and had served 
for three successive school years as a teacher in the public 
schools of Malden and was therefore serving at discretion 
under G. L. (Ter# Ed.) c. 71, s# 41. On December 17, 1935, 
the school committee elected the petitioner as "Principal of 
the Lincoln Jimior High School and Lincoln Elementary School 
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to begin work on January 10, 1936•” It was also voted 
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that his salary ”be fixed at $3,000.00 for the Lincoln 
Junior High and $300.00 for the Lincoln Elementary School.” 
On January 6, 1936, after a city election had brou^t about 
a change in the personnel of the board, the new board voted 
that ”the Superintendent be instructed not to recognize” 
the vote of December 17, ”inasmuch as it does not conform 
with Section 59, Chapter 71 of the General Laws of Massachu¬ 
setts and that the position be declared vacant.” That section 
provides that superintendents of schools ”shall recommend to 
I 
the committee teachers, textbooks, and courses of study.” 
The auditor has found t hat both votes of the committee were 
taken in good faith. His subsidiary findings are not incon¬ 
sistent with this conclusion. Sweeney v. School Committee 
of Revere 249 Mass. 525, 530. The petitioner now seeks to 
compel recognition of himself as principal of the Lincoln 
Junior High School with the salary for that office voted to 
him on December 17. • v- 
The school committee had ”general charge of all the 
public schools. ”G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 71, s. 37. Thissec— 
tion has been construed broadly. Hammond v. Hyde Park 195 
Mass. 29, 30. Leonard v. School Committee of Springfield 
241 Mass. 325. Russell v. Gannon 281 Mass. 398. The gen¬ 
eral managerial powers of the ccmimittee continued to exist 
after the election of the petitioner on December 17. Those 
powers included the power to change by a majority vote the 
duties of teachers on tenure at discretion and to assign them 
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to nBW duties, or to continue them in their existing 
duties, or to return them to duties formerly perfomed, 
although such teachers cannot he dismissed from the teach¬ 
ing force without compliance with G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 71, 
s. 42. And a principal is merely a teacher who is entrusted 
with special duties of direction or management. Boody v. 
School Committee of Bamstahle 276 Mass. 154. The second 
vote of the committee on January 6, 1936, did not dismiss 
the petitioner from the teaching force. It did no more than 
revoke the vote of December 17, 1935, which in any event by 
its terms was not to go into practical effect until January 
10 and which therefore never became effective at all. The 
purpose and result of the second vote were merely to continue 
the petitioner as a teacher in the performance of the same 
duties which he performed before December 17. It was within 
the power of the committee to do this. The petitioner has 
in fact continued to perform those duties and to receive his 
salary therefor. This is not like cases where an officer is 
elected to a particular office with permanently fixed duties 
for an established term. 
Even if a majority of the committee were mistaken in 
their belief that the vote in December electing the petitioner 
as principal was Invalid because the superintendent had not 
recommended the petitioner under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 71, s 
59, or because the superintendent had not nominated the pe- 
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titloner as it Is contended that a rule of the committee 
required, that belief is not shown to have been the domin¬ 
ating reason for the vote of January 6. On the contrary 
it is found that the majority of the committee as consti¬ 
tuted in January believed that the petitioner was not quali¬ 
fied for the position and that he had been elected without 
proper consideration. Purtheimore it is difficult to see 
how erroneous beliefs as to law or fact can vitiate a vote 
passed in legal manner and within the power of the govern¬ 
ing board* 
Petition dismissed. 
t 
The Salaries of Teachers are Determined by the Committee 
\ 
The salaries of teachers are determined by the school 
committee. It is not within the province of any other de- 
r 
partment of the town or city goveriment to determine the 
compensation of teachers. ^However, we see in the Paquette 
case that the legislative authority which has delegated 
this power to the school committee can withdraw some portion 
or all of the delegated power. In this case a fj.nance 
commission received authority from the General Court to in¬ 
stitute general pay reductions, and it was held by the court 
that this statutory delegation of power was supreme over the 
power of the school committee and represented a temporary 
suspension of that portion of the school committee’s 
full superintendence of the schools* 
Lillian J. Paquette v. City of Pall River 
278 Mass. 172 (1932) 
Two actions of contract. Writ dated June 26, 1931. 
t I 
The powers reposed in the Pall River Board of Pinance 
under St. 1931, c. 44, are extensive enough to warrant the 
action as here disclosed. By the express terras of s. 8 
that board has supervision of all financial affairs of the 
defendant, including those relating to the public schools; 
it is empowered to make recommendations to the school comm¬ 
ittee as well as to other municipal officers. The enact¬ 
ment of this statute, so far as concerns the issues here 
involved, was without the competency of the General Court 
in order to inaugurate and insure necessary economies in 
the municipal administration of the defendant. Broadhurst 
V. pall River 278 Mass. 167, and cases cited. The action 
of that board and of the school committee did not in any 
degree impair the contractual obligation existing between 
the plaintiffs and the defendant. The vote of the Board of 
Pinance was sufficient basis for the action of the school 
committee in exercising its discretion to make the reduction 
in the salaries of the plaintiffs. 
4 
The enactment of St. 1931, c. 44, was within: the 
general power of the Legislature even if its s. 8 be regarded 
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as an amendment or suspension of G. L. c, 71, s. 43* The 
General Court has extensive authority respecting cities and 
towns* It may distribute the functions of municipal govern- 
ment among several officers and boards and from time to time 
may revoke,, or alter, or modify the duties thus reposed and 
grant them to other and newly established instrumentalities 
as in its judgment the public welfare may require* Embraced 
with this broad prerogative would be the transfer of the ex¬ 
ercise of the discretion vested in the school committee by 
G* L* c* 71, s* 43, to the board of finance so far as con¬ 
cerned Pall River, or to require its joint exercise by action 
by both* There is no requirement for uniformity in the laws 
for the executive and administrative functions of the several 
cities* Pour different general forms of city charter are set 
forth in G* L* c* 43. Prior to the enactment of the first 
. general law of that nature in St. 1915, c* 267, there was and 
there still is great diversity of substance and of detail 
among the charters of the several cities* Cunningham v* 
Mayor of Cambridge 222 Mass* 574, 576—577* See Wheelock 
V* Lowell 196 Mass* 220,226-227 for collection of references. 
The constitutionality of St* 1931, c* 44, so far as the plain— 
tiffs are entitled to question its terms, is covered by Broad- 
hurst V* Pall River 278 Mass. 167* In the Paquette case, the 
point is raised that the vote to reduce the salary of the 
plaintiff was invalid because of failure to comply with the 
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provision of G. L. c. 71, s. 43 to the effect that the 
salary of no teacher serving at discretion shall he re¬ 
duced without his consent "except by a general salary re¬ 
vision affecting equally all teachers of the same salary 
grade." The pertinent facts in this connection are that 
T 
there were employed by the defendant several other teachers 
receiving the same annual salary as this plaintiff, whose 
salaries were not reduced. None of those teachers had been 
elected to serve at discretion but they were employed under 
\ 
yearly contracts and had not been so employed more than 
three consecutive years. Several of those teachers were en¬ 
gaged in schools of distinct character and in teaching of a 
different nature from the employment of this plaintiff. 
Others, while apparently employed in schools of the same char¬ 
acter and in teaching of the same,general classification, were 
not serving at the discretion of the school committee because 
not eligible for that tenure, not having been employed for the 
requisite period of time. ^The governing statutory words to 
be interpreted are "same salary grade.". Clearly identity of 
salary is not the sole test. So to interpret the phrase 
would eliminate the word "grade". It is a familiar canon of 
statutory construction that every word of a legislative enact¬ 
ment must be given force and effect and no word treated as 
superfluous, unless no other possible course is open. The 
word "gi^de" has significance in connection with schools. It 
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has toeen customary to describe the several schools in which 
instruction is given preparation for entrance to the high 
school as ”the grades".. It has a wider import in this con¬ 
text because it is designed plainly to include all public 
school teachers employed in a particular municipality, re¬ 
gardless of the name of the school in which the service may 
be rendered* The word is broad enough also to comprise tenure 
of service* Two teachers, one having a contract for one year 
only and the other having the continuous and indeterminate 
service enjoyed by the plaintiff, cannot ri^tly be said to 
be in the same grade even though receiving identical sums 
as salary* Perhaps the word may have other bearings and im¬ 
plications* Salary is only one factor in determining whether 
specified teachers are "of the same salary grade". In de¬ 
ciding whether a general salary revision affects all such 
teachers, not only must consideration be given to "salary" 
received, but also to the sum of the factors comprehended 
within the:.scope of "gradej^ as already suggested. The re¬ 
sult is that it does not appear on this record that there 
has been any violation of G* L* c* 71, s* 43, in making the 
salary reduction here attacked. There was a general salary 
revision and the salary of each plaintiff was thereby re¬ 
duced* It is not necessary to review one by one the rulings 
of the trial Judge. There was no error of law in any of them. 
In each case the entry may be 
Finding for the defendant to stand. 
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The Tenure Law Protects the Teacher 
The greatest nuniber of recent cases in educational law 
which have continued in litigation as far as the Supreme Judi¬ 
cial Court have been those relating to dismissal of teachers 
and superintendents* Althou^ the school coimnlttees have rather 
effective control in the matter of election and dismissal of tea¬ 
chers, there is a necessity for guiding statutory law in the mat¬ 
ter of dismissal* Fortunately, the tenure acts prevent the hasty 
discharge of teachers at the whim of a school committee which hap¬ 
pens to come into power. A teacher who has served for three con¬ 
secutive school years then becomes an elected teacher ”to serve 
at the discretion of the school committee”* It is now well set¬ 
tled that there must be not only opportunity for a hearing before 
final dismissal of such a teacher, but there must be a substsutitia- 
\ 
tion of the charges upon which the dismissal is based* The Graves 
/ 
case, although not the most recent example of its type well sum¬ 
marizes the present law of tenure as the statute was Improved in 
1934 to require substantiation of charges* 
3* Monroe Graves vs. School Committee of Wellesley* 
299 Mas3.80 (1937) 
The petitioner, by this petition for a writ of mandamus, 
seeks to be reinstated in the office of superintendent of schools 
of Wellesley* Petitioner had been employed as Superintendent of 
Schools since 1914* School Committee notified him of intended 
dismissal and he sou^t written charges and a hearing. The 
written charges dealt with his apparent inability to maintain 
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tlie school system as one continuous and consistent whole, 
failure to inspire citizens with his ability in managing the 
schools. Hearings were held by the respondents on April 13, 23, 
26 and 26, 1936. On April 27, 1936, the respondents passed the 
following vote: ”13iat S. Monroe Graves be dismissed as Superin¬ 
tendent of the Wellesley Schools, effective as of July 31, 1936." 
One of the respondents who presided over these hearings annoimced 
that it was the intention of the respondents not to call any wit¬ 
nesses or produce other evidence in support of the alleged char¬ 
ges, and they called no witnesses and produced no other evidence 
in substantiation of the so called charges. Testimony and other 
evidence were introduced by the petitioner in contradiction to 
and refutation of the alleged charges. "Much evidence of a doc¬ 
umentary nature and exhibits in the form of reports and other 
literature," favorable to the work of the petitioner, were intro¬ 
duced which the respondents did not read or examine. All testim¬ 
ony and evidence presented were favorable to the petitioner and 
the alleged charges as stated by the respondents were not substan¬ 
tiated in any degree as required by St. 1934, c. 123. 
It is plain that prior to the enactment of St. 1934, c. 123, 
whereby G. L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 71, sec.42, was amended, the dismiss- 
/ 
al here assailed would have been within the power of the school 
committee. That is settled by Corrigan v. School Committee of 
New Bedford, 250 Mass. 334. Said c. 123 applies to a town such 
as Wellesley so far as here material is in these words: "In 
every such town a teacher or superintendent employed at discre¬ 
tion under the preceding section shall not be dismissed, except 
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for inefficiency, incapacity, conduct unbecoming a teacher or 
superintendent, insubordination or other good cause . . . nor 
\inless, if he so requests, he shall have been furnished by the 
committee with a written charge or charges of the cause or cau¬ 
ses for which his dismissal is proposed; nor unless, if he so 
requests, he has been given a hearing before the school committee 
Tidiich may be either public or private at the discretion of the 
school committee and at which he may be represented by counsel, 
present evidence and call witnesses to testify in his behalf and 
examine them; nor unless the charge or charges shall have been 
substantiated; • . Thus a material alteration was made in 
the governing statute. Prior to 1934 no judicial investigation 
was required as a prerequisite to removal. The committee in 
good faith could, by the requisite majority, dismiss a superin¬ 
tendent of schools without legal cause. After the enactment of 
said c. 123 the procedure for dismissal resembled that required 
by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 31, secs.43 and 45, in ending the employ¬ 
ment of persons in the classified public service and police offic¬ 
ers whose tenures were protected by the civil service laws (see 
G. L. (Ter.Ed.) c, 31, sec. 42A). Proceedings under those sec¬ 
tions partake of the nature of a ”judicial investigation.” 
McCarthy v. Emerson 202 Mass.352,354. Stiles v. Municipal Co\m- 
cil of Lowell, 233 Mass.174,181. Such an officer as the petition¬ 
er can be dismissed in conformity to the statute only on certain 
specified grounds or for "other good cause.” These conditions 
mean that "removal is not authorized without notice and hearing 
... The teim removal ”for cause” means removal "for cause suf¬ 
ficient in law. That can only be deteimined after an opportunity 
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to be heard and a finding so that the sufficiency of the cause 
may be determined in court. *” Corrigan v. School Committee of 
Kew Bedford, 250 Mass.354,338. The allegations of the petition 
already recited show that the respondents did not proceed as re¬ 
quired in a judicial investigation. Before they gave the peti¬ 
tioner any intimation of their intention to dismiss him, they 
notified him that they had already appointed his successor. Mani¬ 
festly this was not in accordance with a judicial investigation. 
The course of procedure by the respondents was not in con¬ 
formity to the requirements of St. 1934, c. 123. It is doubtful 
whether there was a written formulation of definite and specific 
acts showing a good cause for dismissal sufficiently concrete in 
nature to be susceptible of proof at a hearing. The case at bar 
in this respect is quite distinguishable from Rinaldo v. School 
Committee of Revere, Mass. Adv. Sh. (1936) 843. Of course the 
nicety of a criminal indictment is not required. Considerable 
latitude is given to the school committee in stating grounds for 
dismissal but they must amount to a good cause. McKenna v. White, 
287 Mass. 490, 495. The allegations of the petition are categor¬ 
ical to the effect that the respondents called no witnesses and 
introduced no'"evidence and that no evidence was Introduced unfav¬ 
orable to the reputation, standing, efficiency, or competency of 
the petitioner, or that substantiated any of the alleged charges 
of the respondents, but that all the evidence was in support of 
the petitioner’s contention that he had faithfully and efficient¬ 
ly perfoimed his duties as superintendent of schools. These 
averments of the petition cannot be treated as vain assertions, 
because the respondents by their demurrer have ac3mitted the truth 
of them for the purposes of this proceeding. 
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A mandate of said St. 1934, c. 123, is that there can he 
no removal ”\mless the charge or charges shall have been sub¬ 
stantiated.” The word "substantiated” has been defined to 
mean "to establish the existence or truth of, by true or com- 
petent evidence." State v. Lock, 302 Mo. 400, 412, That is 
the signification in common usage of the word employed in the 
governing statute. There is no provision for a review of the 
good cause found by the school committee by a district court 
judge, as in cases arising under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 31, Secs. 
43, 45, and in such instances mandamus will lie to enforce 
compliance with the statute. Peckham v. Mayor of Pall River, 
253 Mass. 590. The respondents called no witnesses and offer¬ 
ed no evidence. The witnesses called by the petitioner may 
have been disbelieved but it is alleged that their testimony 
was wholly favorable to the petitioner. Disbelief of their 
testimony is not the equivalent of evidence in support of the 
charges produced by the respondents. While the decision wheth¬ 
er proper charges have been substantiated rests with the school 
committee, an affirmative decision can be rendered only when the 
truth of the charges has been supported by evidence adequate in 
law to warrant that conclusion. There is no Incompatibility in 
such a finding made by the person or tribunal which has form¬ 
ulated the charges. Executive and judicial faculties may be com¬ 
bined in one body of men. Swan v. Justices of the Superior Court, 
222 Mass.542. 
The result is that evidence has not been disclosed on the 
record which warranted a dismissal of the petitioner. No one 
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of the charges made by the respondents appears to have '’been sub¬ 
stantiated.” Ihere has been no "judicial investigation” such as 
is required by St. 1934, c. 123. a?here has been no compliance 
with the essential provisions of St. 1934, c. 123. That statute 
in substance and effect required a hearing upon evidence. Nothing 
can be treated as evidence which is not introduced as such. 
> 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. United States, 264 U. S. 258. 
4 
Charges cannot be substantiated without supporting evidence. 
American Employers* Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Insurance, Mass. 
Adv. Sh. (1937) 1207, 1212-1213. The general demurrer must be 
overruled. It is not necessary to examine the special demurrers. 
Demurrer overruled. 
The school committee cannot avoid the effect of the "three 
consecutive school years" clause in the statute by electing a 
teacher on the last day of the third consecutive year so as to 
thwart the force of the law and prolong the period before tenure 
to four years. Frye v. Leicester, 302 Mass. 421. 
A clerk who occasionally was called in to act as a substitu¬ 
te teacher is not an elected teacher within the meaning of the 
statute so as to be entitled to the protection of the tenure law. 
LaMarsh v. Chicopee. 272 Mass. 15. 
The marriage of a woman teacher in violation of a school 
committee rule that married women cannot teach in the public 
schools can be "good cause" for removal of that teacher after a 
hearing. 
Rinaldo v. Dreyer. 294 Mass. 167. 
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The Teacher and the Child. 
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Among the great mass of material in court decisions on edu¬ 
cation the least common cases that have gone to the Supreme Judi¬ 
cial Court are those relating to the teacher and the child. Becau¬ 
se it is the duty of the teacher to enforce school committee rules 
on the first front, we may at first regard many of the attendance 
and exclusion cases as teacher-pupil relations. However, they 
have been classified elsewhere and we have now to consider only 
the matter of class-room discipline and the liability of the tea¬ 
cher for personal injury to the child in his charge. 
The authority of the school committee to exclude a child from 
school is never delegated to a teacher, but the teacher may send a 
child home, pending a report to the committee for further action. 
There is no statutory law forbidding corporal punishment in 
the schools, and except where the school committee forbids it, 
reasonable and necessary punishment is permitted. 
Walter A. Bishop vs. Inhabitants of Rowley, 
165 Mass. 460 (1896) 
Tort, for an alleged unlawful exclusion of the plaintiff from 
a public school of the defendant town in which he was a pupil. 
Allen, J. For an alleged fault, the teacher excluded or suspended 
the plaintiff from school until he should receive the permission 
of the school committee to return. The school committee continued 
such suspension, and would not allow the plaintiff to return to the 
school until he should apply to some one of them for permission to 
return, promise to do his best at school. This assiamed that 
he had been guilty of a fault, and required from him a virtual ack¬ 
nowledgment thereof. His father applied to the school committee 
I 
for a hearing by them upon the matter of the plaintiff »s miscon¬ 
duct, and the question of fact involved therein. The committee 
refused to give such hearing. 
It is well settled that a teacher has no authority to excl¬ 
ude a child pemanently from school, unless such teacher acts 
under the order of the school committee. This authority is ves¬ 
ted in the school committee, to whom a parent must appeal in case 
of a teacher’s refusal to instruct a child. It is the act of the 
school committee of which the plaintiff complains. No question 
arises as to the extent of a teacher’s authority, because the 
permanent exclusion of the plaintiff was not the teacher’s act. 
If the school committee acts in good faith in determining 
the facts in a particular case, its decisions cannot be revised 
by the courts* Watson vs. Cambridge, 157 Mass. 561. Davis vs. 
Boston, 133 Mass. 103. Hodgkins v. Rockport, 105 Mass. 475. 
Sherman v. Charlestown, 8 Cush. 160. But the power of exclusion 
is not a merely arbibary power, to be exercised without ascertain¬ 
ing the facts. In all the cases heretofore decided by this court 
the essential facts were not in dispute. In the present case the 
facts were in dispute, and a hearing was asked for on the question 
of fact, and it was refused. Under these circumstances, the perm¬ 
anent exclusion of the plaintiff from the school was unlawful* Tbe 
school committee should have given the plaintiff or his father a 
chance to be heard upon the facts, or, in other words, should have 
listened to. his side of the case. The plaintiff was therefore en¬ 
titled to maintain an action against the town. Pub. Sts. c. 47, 
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Such action is not defeated by the finding of the court that 
the plaintiff was disrespectful to the teacher. The effect of 
this finding upon the question of damages is not now before us. 
Exceptions sustained. 
'/ 
The Liability of the Teacher for Personal Injury 
Arthur Pulgoni v. Thomas H. Johnston 
302 Mass. 421 (1939) 
Tort. Writ In the Superior Court dated May 14, 1936. 
A verdict for the defendant was ordered by P. T. Hammond, J., 
who reported the action. 
Qua, J. The plaintiff, who was a pupil in the Medford Vocation¬ 
al School, a public school, was injured, while operating a band 
saw, which it could be found projected at the time of the accid¬ 
ent about an eighth of an inch sidewise from the rim of the un- 
giiarded lower wheel under the "table”. 
The defendant was a teacher in the school, but the actual 
woodworking was taught by a Mr. Roberts. The defendant taught 
English, science, mathematics, mechanical drawing and hygiene, 
which were "related” to the cabinet making course, and the def¬ 
endant’s school room was known as the "related room." 
There was evidence of the following facts: On the morning 
of the accident the plaintiff asked the defendant if he (the plain 
tiff) could make a body post for an automobile. The defendant 
gave his permission. The plaintiff found both of the band saws 
which were in the "mill room” broken and so used a third machine 
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which was in the "related room.” The defendant and about fifteen 
pupils were in this room. The plaintiff worked on the saw for 
three and one-half hours, and later, after going to lunch and to 
another class, started the saw again, and the accident happened. 
The defendant was in the room all the time while the plaintiff 
used the saw; it "was the custom in the school for the instructors 
to adjust the machines or they were adjusted by a student Tinder 
the personal supervision of the instructor." If a student notic¬ 
ed the saw running over the edge, he would tell the instructor. 
A fellow student of the plaintiff testified that at some time in 
the morning, before the accident, when walking by, he saw "the 
edge of the blade running over the wheel and the cause of that 
was the adjustment of the top wheel was slightly off." 
The age of the plaintiff does not appear, but he himself tes¬ 
tified that he was a "senior"; that he had been enrolled in the 
cabinet making course for the three preceding years; that he had 
been taught and had worked on band saws in the jimior high school 
and during his three years at high school; and that he had used 
the same band saw^about ten times within a month. 
The school was a free Institution maintained by the city in 
its public or governmental capacity and not in the quasi-private 
capacity. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 74, sec. 1-24. Hill vs. Boston, 
122 Mass. 344. The plaintiff came to the school as a member of 
the public entitled to enjoy its privileges. Learock v. Putnam, 
11 Mass. 499, 501. The defendant was a public servant with lim¬ 
ited duties and powers. At least since the leading cases of Moyn- 
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ihan V. Todd, 188 Mass. 301, and Barry v. Snith, 191 Mass. 78, it 
has been settled in this Commonwealth that public officers engag¬ 
ed wholly in the perfoimance of public duties are liable only for 
their own acts of misfeasance in connection with ministerial mat¬ 
ters. 
In our opinion, the evidence would not support a verdict ag¬ 
ainst the defendant under the rule just stated. Between the def¬ 
endant and the plaintiff there was no relation of employer em¬ 
ployee. The defendant was imder no obligation to furnish the plain¬ 
tiff a safe machine. He did not in fact furnish the band saw 
was in no way responsible for the manner of its construction or for 
the absence of a guard upon the lower wheel. There was no evidence 
that the defendant employed this machine in connection with any of 
the subjects which he taught, or that he had any control over it, 
except that it was in the "related room” where he taught and that 
he gave permission to use it. If negligently giving the plaintiff 
permission to use the machine when it was out of order would be a 
misfeasance within the rule hereinbefore stated, which we need not 
decide (see Bell v. Josselyn, 3 Gray, 309, 311: Tibbets v. Went¬ 
worth, 248 Mass. 468, 472, and cases cited) we fail to discover 
any substantial evidence that the defendant was negligent in this 
respect. We assume that the permission given to the plaintiff 
included the use of the machine in the "related room." Apparently 
the absence of a guard on the lower whelly was of no consequence 
as long as the wheels were properly adjusted so that the saw would 
run in the centers of the rims. There was no evidence that the 
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wheels were not properly adjusted when the defendant gave his per¬ 
mission. There was no evidence as to how often they became out of 
adjustment or from what causes. Evidence that at some undetermin¬ 
ed time ^^earlier in the moming before the accident", but appar¬ 
ently after the plaintiff had begtua using the machine, the "edge 
of the blade was running over the wheel" will not charge the defen¬ 
dant with negligence. So far as appears this may have been due to 
the manner in which the plaintiff himself operated the saw. It is 
not shown to have been brought to the attention of the defendant 
at any time. The plaintiff, although a student, was an experien¬ 
ced operator of the saws, including the one on which he was hurt. 
There was nothing to indicate that he did not know all that he 
needed to know about the condition and adjustment of the saw, or 
that he needed immediate supervision while operating it, even if 
failure to fumish such supervision could be considered misfeas¬ 
ance. 
In view of the limited nature of the defendant’s legal oblig¬ 
ations there is no foundation for a verdict for the plaintiff. This 
result is consistent with that reached in other somewhat analagous 
situations. 
Judgment for the defendant on the verdict. 
The threat of possible civil suits for negligence has long 
been the "bugbear" of vocational instructors, and in Massachuse¬ 
tts most teachers of shop work have insured at a nominal premium 
to gain protection against such actions. Undoubtedly, the insur¬ 
ance is a wise investment for the legal defence that it offers. 
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but in t^ct, the limited liability of the teacher in such a sit¬ 
uation makes extremely unlikely the chance of a suit being suc-^ 
cessfully carried against him. The extremely low insurance rate 
indicates that there is little danger for teachers losing a suit 
in such a case.' There is always the possibility that such negli¬ 
gence might be shown as to warrant a recovery. 
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